DAY 1 – MAY 13TH

Imke von Maur (Osnabrück) – »Robots don't care: The import of affect, meaning and understanding«

Eva Weber-Guskar (Bochum) – »Social Robots as New Companions: Challenging the Myth of Mutuality«

Matthew Dennis (Delft) – »Social Robotics and Digital Well-Being: Living Well with Artificial Agents«

Niklas Ellerich-Groppe, Merle Weßel, Mark Schweda (Oldenburg) – »Queering Robots for a Good Life? An Ethical Analysis of Stereotypes in Social Robotics for Aged Care«

Cordula Brand, Leonie Bossert, Thomas Potthast (Tübingen) – »Affective Computing in Social Training Scenarios«

Imke von Maur (Osnabrück)
ROBOTS DON'T CARE:
THE IMPORT OF AFFECT, MEANING AND UNDERSTANDING

- robots lack important abilities for care

  - no understanding .... (cp. Searle Chinese room)

- appearance of care is not sufficient

  → real care matters

  using care robots leads to dehumanizing

Points of discussion:

- *broader definition of care?*

- *What about professional care? / How much objectification might be justifiable?*

Eva Weber-Guskar (Bochum)

SOCIAL ROBOTS AS NEW COMPANIONS: CHALLENGING THE MYTH OF MUTUALITY

DOES A LACK OF MUTUALITY SPEAK A AGAINST PERSONAL AFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH EAI-SYSTEMS?

BUT emotional mutuality is lacking in many other interactions, e.g., animal-human, child-parent

Argument from the Lack of Mutuality

P1   A good personal affective relationship entails emotional mutuality.

P2   An AI-system does not have emotions (but can only simulate them).

K1   (from P1 and P2) Therefore, there cannot be emotional mutuality between a person and an AI-system.

K2   (from P1 and K1) A personal affective relationship with an AI-system cannot be a good one.

CONCLUSION:

There may be justified worries (deception / misuse / moral negligence) concerning personal affective relationships with EAI systems.

- **BUT the lack of emotional mutuality is not one of those.**

Personal *affective* relationship: A relation between two individuals, constituted by an extended series of interactions over time that rely on knowledge about each other, that produce specific emergent properties, and that leads to an *affective attachment* between the individuals.

Matthew Dennis (Delft)
SOCIAL ROBOTICS AND DIGITAL WELL-BEING: LIVING WELL WITH ARTIFICIAL AGENTS

Two reasons to prefer the **disembodied** vision of social robots:

1. Highly likely that technological constraints on embodiment (locomotion, uncanny valley) will give social robots this form.
   + (logistical, financial, & ecological constraints)
2. Disembodied social robots are more compatible with living well.

PRO DISEMBODIED ROBOTS

- digital minimalism *(less technology is often better)*

- avoids important ethical problems *(objectification, mistreatment of robots, …)*

- practical advantages *(costs, accessibility, ubiquity)*

- more scope to focus on different faces of our personhood *(memory – dementia, neurodiversity, …)*

Niklas Ellerich-Groppe, Merle Weßel, Mark Schweda (Oldenburg)

QUEERING ROBOTS FOR A GOOD LIFE?
AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS OF STEREOTYPES IN SOCIAL ROBOTICS FOR AGED CARE

mainstream stereotypes

REFLECT ON

stereotypes: e.g. *gender, age, group membership* & stereotyping users

3 dimensions

(Martha Nussbaum (2006). *Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership*)

- basic physical

- sensual, emotional, intellectual

- relational

What should we do?

- neutralizing? / explaining?

- queering age and gender in users & robots

Conclusions

– Beneficial and detrimental implications of stereotyping robotics in aged care for a good life

– Further empirical research on the technological shaping of capabilities and conceptions of good life (in old age) is needed (Coeckelbergh 2012; Misselhorn et al. 2013)

– Queering as a promising perspective for diversity-sensitive social robotics in need of further research

– Beyond the individual good life: CA sets limits regarding stereotyping and queering

https://uol.de/medizinethik/mitarbeitende

Cordula Brand, Leonie Bossert, Thomas Potthast (Tübingen)

AFFECTIVE COMPUTING IN SOCIAL TRAINING SCENARIOS

„Orientation towards the common good in the age of digitalization: narratives of transformation between planetary boundaries and AI."

What has AI-related Ethics to take into account?

- Affective Computing (AC)

  - recognizing emotional states to adapt to & simulating emotions to enrich & simplify human-computer interaction

examples:

Education
- Learning companions (process)
- Learning assistance (topics)
- Training programs:
  - Intercultural communication
  - Job interviews (PARLEY)
  - Special needs education (Qtrobot):

SDG's, here esp. Nr. 4:
„Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all."

4 QUALITY EDUCATION

- *security & privacy:* same standards as for medical data
- *autonomy:* should not be reduced
- *education:* consider the weakest and poorest, goal of a good life

https://uni-tuebingen.de/einrichtungen/zentrale-einrichtungen/internationales-zentrum-fuer-ethik-in-den-wissenschaften/team/dr-cordula-brand/

DAY 2 – MAY 14TH

Michael Kühler (Karlsruhe) – »Loving Robots: Living an Illusion«

Karen Lancaster (Nottingham) – »Granny and the Sexbots«

Lily Frank (Eindhoven), Sven Nyholm, Cindy Friedman (Utrecht) – »Emotional embodiment in humanoid sex and love robots«

Wrap up and last thoughts

Michael Kühler (Karlsruhe)
LOVING ROBOTS: LIVING AN ILLUSION

CAN WE BE IN ROMANTIC LOVE WITH ROBOTS IF THEY LACK ASPECTS OF PERSONHOOD?

CAN EPISTEMIC CHALLENGES MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

personhood in robots?

eventually fulfilled:

- *ability to think, act rationally, reciprocate, communicate*

not fulfilled:

- *feel pleasure & pain / have consciousness & self-consciousness / autonomy*

loving without knowing that the beloved one is not a person?

- **all kinds of love** *(union - interpersonal sharing - individualist caring)* **in which one participant lacks** *feeling pleasure & pain / having consciousness & self-consciousness / autonomy* **are illusions**

https://www.arrti.kit.edu/deutsch/160_185.php

Karen Lancaster (Nottingham)
GRANNY AND THE SEXBOTS

HOW TO MEET SEXUAL NEEDS OF OLDER PEOPLE IN CARE HOMES?

via other residents / care home staff / sex workers / sexual aids / sexbots ?

→ analysis of sexbots: answers to potential critical objections

- *hygiene* → can be solved
- *security reasons* → are not reported
- *might cause emotional attachment* → but this can also be considered as an enhancement of life
- *problematic design (passive, not complex, heavy, rigid)* → design could be changed

CONCLUSION: *Sexbots are possibly the best solution if following changes are made:*

- *changes in societal attitude towards sexbots use*
- *changes in societal attitude towards sex among elderly people*
- *changes to the weight and activity levels of sexbots*

https://karenlancaster.weebly.com/

Lily Frank (Eindhoven), Sven Nyholm, Cindy Friedman (Utrecht)

EMOTIONAL EMBODIMENT IN HUMANOID SEX AND LOVE ROBOTS

Q 1: is the **value of the emotions undermined** when their object is an entity that appears human, but does not actually experience corresponding affective states?

Q 2: does the use of a **humanoid form in an artefact designed exclusively for one-sided sexual satisfaction express a lack of respect for human dignity**, specifically a lack of respect for the emotional capacities normally associated with beings of this shape and appearance?

Q 3: if a highly sophisticated robot with a humanoid form were able to **simulate behaviors** typically associated with distinctly human emotions, would this make any difference to how it is correct and proper to conduct oneself around that robot?

discussing YES and NO answers

Thinking the Unthinkable
Is/Ought Variations

Unthinkable

Thinking Otherwise

Cannot and Should Not

Can and Should

Can but Should Not

Cannot but Should

https://sites.google.com/view/lilyevafrank/home