NORMATIVE ANIMALS

June 17- June 18, 2021

Organizers:

s

Simon Fitzpatrick

John Carroll University

Kristin Andrews

York University

Evan Westra

York University



Memory slices by Anna Strasser

DISCLAIMER: JUST MEMORIES – AIMING FOR CORRESPONDENCE WITH REALITY BUT CANNOT GUARANTEE IT.

Photo credit: https://www.pexels.com/@cottonbro

DAY 1

Session 1: Normativity in non-human primates | Chair: Joshua Plotnik

- Carel van Schaik, University of Zurich. *"The biological foundations of morality and normativity: A primate perspective."*
- Chris Krupenye, Durham University and Johns Hopkins University. *"Apes' expectations of the social world."*
- Sarah Brosnan, Georgia State University. "*A bottom-up view of normativity in non-human primates."*

Session 2: Animals as moral beings | Chair: Cecilia Heyes

- Susana Monsó & Birte Wrage, Messerli Research Institute, Vienna. *"Tactful animals: How the study of touch can inform the animal normativity debate."*
- Birte Wrage & Judith Benz-Schwarzburg, Messerli Research Institute. *"What if animals are moral beings? Mapping the ethical implications."*

Session 3: Normative obligations to nonhuman animals | Chair: Simon Fitzpatrick

- Nicolas Delon, New College of Florida. *"Letting animal agents off the hook."*
- Andrew Fenton, Dalhousie University. *"Intersubjective expectations, shared norms, and captive animal well-being."*

Session 4: The psychology of norms | Chair: Suzanne MacDonald

- Daniel Kelly, Purdue University. *"Normative psychology and the (many) taxonomies of norms."*
- Jordan Theriault, Northeastern University. *"The Sense of Should: A biologically grounded framework for modeling normative motivation."*
- Evan Westra & Kristin Andrews, York University. *"The pluralistic psychology of norms."*



Carel van Schaik, University of Zurich.

THE BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MORALITY AND NORMATIVITY:
A PRIMATE PERSPECTIVE

minimal morality: urge to assist others
minimal normativity: expectations about actions

one way to explain

- PARENTAL CARE → social bonds → co-opted for interdependence relationships
- experimental design: measuring the temperature of the nose
- necessity or primacy of parental care?
- probably not a necessary feature



FUTURE RESEARCH

What about species where parental care is largely absent?

- octopuses & snakes

Chris Krupenye, Durham University and Johns Hopkins University.

APES' EXPECTATIONS OF THE SOCIAL WORLD

- marmosets donate more food when alone than when being watched, which is intuitively surprising
  - **private morality (vs private normativity) in nonhuman animals**

FUTURE RESEARCH

- Maybe pigeons pigeonomorphize their feeders?
- Disassociate ToM & normativity!
  - since the idea that norms require tracking other's expectations is silent on cognitive mechanism

Sarah Brosnan, Georgia State University.

A BOTTOM-UP VIEW OF NORMATIVITY IN NON-HUMAN PRIMATES

- sense of fairness
- properties
- ....

Susana Monsó & Birte Wrage, Messerli Research Institute, Vienna.

TACTFUL ANIMALS:
HOW THE STUDY OF TOUCH CAN INFORM THE ANIMAL NORMATIVITY DEBATE



functions of touch
- discriminative
- affiliative
- vigilance

FUTURE RESEARCH

"Potentially 'knowing' about what kind of touch hurts / comforts the other"
→ new method to study Theory of Mind? → Theory of Sentience (ToS)

credits to Brenda de Groot

Birte Wrage & Judith Benz-Schwarzburg, Messerli Research Institute.

WHAT IF ANIMALS ARE MORAL BEINGS?
MAPPING THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS



in-between reflective and non reflective agency
- care as one way to access morality
- if animals cannot develop caregiving compentence → they can not become moral agents ....

Nicolas Delon, New College of Florida.

LETTING ANIMAL AGENTS OFF THE HOOK



animal agency
(Arruda and Povinelli 2016; Delon 2018; Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011; Glock 2009; Healey and Pepper, forthcoming; Hurley 2003; Jamieson 2017; Purves and Delon 2018; Sebo 2017; Steward 2009; Thomas 2016; Wilcox 2020)

animal morality
(Andrews and Gruen 2014; Behdadi 2020; Bekoff and Pierce 2009; Cova 2013; de Waal 2006; Flack and de Waal 2000; Monsó 2017; Monsó and Andrews, forthcoming; Ferrin 2019; Fitzpatrick 2017; Monsó et al. 2018; Musschenga 2015; Rowlands 2012; Shapiro 2006; Vincent et al. 2018; also see Clark 1984; DeGrazia 1996; Pluhar 1995; Sapontzis 1987).

Rowlands' thesis

'Animals … are motivated to act by moral reasons, not merely causes. … Animals can be moral subjects in the sense that they can act on the basis of moral reasons, where these reasons take the form of emotions with identifiable moral content.' (2012, 35)

Rowlands' dilemma

- *Liberal horn*: accept moral subjecthood *and* moral agency for some animals
- *Conservative horn*: deny moral agency for animals *but also* deflate moral subjecthood

WAYS OUT

Degrees of responsibility

- different capacities that are not all-or-nothing → kinds and degrees
- degrees of
  - reasons-responsiveness
  - blameworthiness

DeGrazia (1996, 204), Coates & Swenson (2013), Fischer & Ravizza (1998) , Tierney (2019)

Faces of responsibility

distinction between

- being responsible & holding responsible *(Smith 2007)*
- attributability & accountability *(Watson 1996)*

Andrew Fenton, Dalhousie University.

INTERSUBJECTIVE EXPECTATIONS, SHARED NORMS, AND CAPTIVE ANIMAL WELL-BEING

1. A non-intellectualized view of norms.*
2. Many humans use norms to order their behavior.*
3. Many other animals form preferences of treatment and can act in order to (try to) satisfy them (i.e., their preferences of treatment matter to them).
4. Many humans can learn to recognize and reliably respect at least some of the preferences of treatment of some other animals.
5. We, humans, have "universal" direct moral duties to at least some other animals and can also acquire non-universal, direct moral duties to these animals through our relationships with them.*

The 3Rs of Replacement, Reduction, and Refinement are widely regarded as ethical constraints on the use of animals in scientific activities (i.e., research, teaching, and testing).*

- It should follow from such a view of the 3Rs that failing to comply with the principles is immoral.

IF exploitative use of animals is considered as morally permissible THEN

- primacy of PRT of captive animals
- respect their sustained dissent
- rehoming animals used in science (when killing would not be a mercy)

Conclusions

Some very conservative ethical commitments favor PRT (and probably non-coercive PRT), respecting sustained dissent, and probably rehoming animals after use.

Iterated encounters between morally conscientious humans (with relevantly specified moral commitments) and captive nonhumans co-create "behavioral norms" that are morally significant.

Daniel Kelly, Purdue University.

NORMATIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE (MANY) TAXONOMIES OF NORMS

distinction between

Norms: "ought" providing **rules** that guide behavior
Norm psychology, or a psychological norm system

1) Descriptive and Injunctive Norms (Cialdini & social psychology)
2) Social norms (Bicchieri)
3) Tight and Loose norms (Gelfand)
4) A number of ways to distinguish/taxonomize types of norms by appeal to their **content** or **subject matter**
5) A number of accounts that distinguish norms by appeal to **both** their content/subject matter as well as their psychological role, the way they are cognized
5) A number of ways of distinguishing norms by appeal exclusively to their psychological role, the way they are cognized

IDEA OF INTERNALISED NORMS & their psychological machinery

- socially aquired behavior-guiding rules



Jordan Theriault, Northeastern University.

THE SENSE OF SHOULD:

A BIOLOGICALLY GROUNDED FRAMEWORK FOR MODELING NORMATIVE MOTIVATION

But what is a norm?



Predictive Coding

- Internal model (brain) predicts input.
- Only unpredicted input (*prediction error*) transmitted.

A norm is a concept, and a concept is a set of predictions.

Barrett, 2017a; 2017b

How can I avoid my brain punishing myself if I intend to violate expectations because of being a revolutionary?

Through an affective response to self-caused social disruption, the brain punishes itself.



Why have a brain at all?

"The brain's purpose reduces to regulating the internal milieu and helping the organism reproduce."
Sterling & Laughlin, 2015, p. 11

Seeing, hearing, thinking, feeling, are all means to an end:
Building a model of the world and using it to survive.

Evan Westra & Kristin Andrews, York University.

THE PLURALISTIC PSYCHOLOGY OF NORMS

Normative regularity:
A socially maintained pattern of behavioral conformity within a community

1. A norm *acquisition* component, to explain how individuals learn normative regularities.
2. A norm *conformity* component, to explain why individuals are disposed to adhere to a given normative regularity.
3. A *social maintenance* component, to show how individual social behaviors contribute to the persistence of the normative regularity



MULTIPLE REALIZATION

- many different underlying cognitive, affective, and ecological processes → not a unified cognitive architecture or basic representational characteristic,
- but rather a shared causal role in sustaining normative regularities

- Sense of should
- Avoiding punishment
- Rewards for conformity
- Sense of social identity & belonging
- Reinforcement learning
- Environmental scaffolding

DAY 2





Session 5: Toolmaking, culture, and the evolution of norms | Chair: Noam Miller

- Jonathan Birch, London School of Economics. *"Toolmaking and the evolution of normative cognition."*
- Thibaud Gruber, University of Geneva. *"Affect and cultural norms in primates"*
- Lydia Luncz, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology. "How social is tool use in primates?"




Session 6: Animals, normativity, and language | Chair: Evan Westra

- Bart Geurts, Radboud University. *"How normativity and language coevolved."*
- Giuseppe Lorini, University of Cagliari. *"Are there non-human nomic animals?"*





Session 7: The natural foundations of normativity | Chair: Valerie Schoof

- Rachell Powell, Boston University & Irina Mikhalevich, Rochester Institute of Technology. *"Social Norms and Superorganisms: A Case for Deep Convergence."*
- Joseph Jebari, Georgetown University. *"Reasons, actions, and ecology."*





Session 8: Animal ought-thoughts | Chair: Kristin Andrews

- Laura Danón, University of Córdoba. *"Ought-thoughts and animal minds."*
- Erik Nelson, Dalhousie University. *"Chimpanzees in the Space of Reasons: A Semantic Analysis of Chimpanzee Behaviour."*
- Simon Fitzpatrick, John Carroll University. *"The evolution of animal norms: a how-possibly model and some questions."*

Jonathan Birch, London School of Economics.

TOOLMAKING AND THE EVOLUTION OF NORMATIVE COGNITION

DEF.: "GUIDED" BY A NORM N WHEN:
i. Notice or anticipate failures to comply with N;
ii. Feel affective pressure when a departure from N occurs or is anticipated;
iii. Know what to do to re-establish conformity with N (pre-empting or correcting behaviour, asking forgiveness/permission, censuring/punishing)

"SKILL FIRST" PICTURE

How did our hominin ancestors come to be micro-regulators of their own and each other's behaviour?

- technical norms: practical skill & elaboration of mechanisms for transmitting skill
- understand the role norms play in regulating skilled action → understand the basic psychological capacities involved in normative guidance

THE "SKILL HYPOTHESIS"

Part I (psychology):

In modern humans, complex motor skills and craft skills, such as toolmaking, are guided by internally represented norms of correct performance.

Part II (evolution):

The capacity to internally represent action-guiding norms of correct performance evolved as a solution to the distinctive problems of standardizing, learning and teaching complex motor skills and craft skills, especially skills related to toolmaking.

Thibaud Gruber, University of Geneva.

AFFECT AND CULTURAL NORMS IN PRIMATES





Lydia Luncz, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology.

How social is tool use in primates?



- no ecological differences
- female transfer
- no genetic difference
- evidence for differences

→ behavioral differences = culture

Comparison of one behavior under the same conditions

Female Immigration

Differences among groups exist despite female immigration:

- Females migrate with the onset of puberty
- Immigration is stressful: low rank, aggression from local females
- `Social passport` (sexual swelling) protects immigrant from these attacks
- Observing immigration is rare

Behavioural transmission = understanding of norms?

Bart Geurts, Radboud University.

How normativity and language coevolved

- focus on giving a promise
- commitment
  - explicitly expressed via language
  - can also be expressed via communication
- long term projects etc.

Giuseppe Lorini, University of Cagliari.

Are there non-human nomic animals?

- new image of humankind as nomic animals *(Wilfrid Sellars, Friedrich August von Hayek, Robert Nozick, and John Searle)*

Following rules vs. acting in light of rules | Regulative rules vs. constitutive rules

- Acting in light of regulative rules vs. acting in light of constitutive rules

Against the thesis that man is the only nomic animal, i.e. against the idea that non-human animals are incapable of acting in light of rules

Animal normativity:
a kind of normativity/deontology
without language

Rachell Powell, Boston University & Irina Mikhalevich, Rochester Institute of Technology.

SOCIAL NORMS AND SUPERORGANISMS: A CASE FOR DEEP CONVERGENCE

eusocial insect society

SOCIAL NORMS

- institutionally enforced codes of conduct
- adaptively designed to solve goal conflicts between nested levels of selection
  - by regulating the behavior of lower-level units in groups that have gone some ways, but not all the way, down the asymptotic path to a proper evolutionary individual





- **Egg-laying policing**: When the molecular signature of a fertile queen is detected, workers are functionally expected to forego reproduction: offenders are attacked/killed and their eggs are destroyed by low-ranking workers
- **Caste-fate policing:** workers control totipotent female larva nutrition to make sure they develop into needed workers rather than supernumerary queen
- **Social status policing:** Gamergates (authorized reproductive workers that serve alongside a fertile queen) punish individuals who feign high status by spraying them with a secretion that marks them as an offender, which then prompts attacks by low-status worker police.

Joseph Jebari, Georgetown University.

REASONS, ACTIONS, AND ECOLOGY

We cite our motives to "explain ourselves" — Intuitive

Desires are, in principle, empirically evaluable — Empirical

We seem to need desires to explain how action is brought about — Explanatory

MOTIVATIONAL VERSUS NORMATIVE REASONS

Alternative: Behavioral Ecology and Normative Action Explanation

- Normative action explanation provides a different pre-theoretic conception of action explanation
- Optimality explanations in behavioral ecology are equivalent to normative action explanations
- Normative action explanation thus satisfies the same criteria as the standard model without entailing subjectivism

example:



Laura Danón, University of Córdoba.

OUGHT_THOUGHTS AND ANIMAL MINDS

Many philosophers think that human animals are the only normative creatures.

- first-order robust “ought-thoughts”
  - composed by secondary representations about how things should be or about how one should act

Erik Nelson, Dalhousie University.

CHIMPANZEES IN THE SPACE OF REASONS:

A SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF CHIMPANZEE BEHAVIOUR

very exciting!!!
unfortunately I was not able to write and listen and understand

Simon Fitzpatrick, John Carroll University.

THE EVOLUTION OF ANIMAL NORMS: A HOW-POSSIBLY MODEL AND SOME QUESTIONS

accounts of normative cognition beyond capacities of nonhuman animals

Understanding and transmission of genuine social norms requires language
- Kitcher and Wrangham, a great many others…
- Genuinely normative concepts require language (e.g., Joyce, 2007)

Genuinely normative cognition requires rich self-consciousness / reflection
- Popular view in philosophy, especially metaethics (e.g., Korsgaard, 2010)

Requires shared intentionality: rich metacognitive sense of "we"
- Tomasello, Schmidt and Rakoczy (2019), and colleagues
- NOTE: certainly not clear that SI is unique to humans (e.g., Goldsborough, et al., 2021)

Requires explicit understanding of others' normative beliefs and expectations
- Bicchieri (2006)

ANIMAL NORMS:
A HOW-POSSIBLY MODEL

- link between selective social learning strategies & emergence of social norms

Copy the majority (conformity bias)

Copy the most successful (prestige bias)

"Proto"-social norms can emerge through a combination of both biases

FUTURE RESEARCH

- affective social learning I (Re-)Enforcement mechanisms? I necessitiy of punishment or "self punishment"
- social benefits vs. social costs I social structure?
- norm system or cognitive gadget or mere "proto"-norms?