

MARCEL BRASS Free will: an empirical perspective



LIBET-STYLE EXPERIMENTS DO NOT DISPROVE FREE WILL

- conscious intentions preceded by brain activation (readiness potential)
- ONLY evidence of an accumulation process -> reflecting the decision process not its outcome



CONSEQUENCES OF BELIEVING IN FREE WILL

- a) intuition can overwrite beliefs (Hume)
- b) catastrophic → fewer moral intuitions (Smilansky)
- c) chance for giving up revenge (Pereboom)

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

- belief in free will
- → praise & punish more
- ightarrow more responsibility for humans than for the environment

however, experts might not be influenced by this ... \rightarrow study with judges

Brass, M., Furstenberg, A., & Mele, A. R. (2019). Why neuroscience does not disprove free will. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.04.024



NELE RUSSWINKEL & STEFAN KOPP Computational cognitive modeling of the predictive active self in situated action



The Active Self

COMPAS project:

- → cognitive status & role of sense of control (SoC) in complex task situations
- computational cognitive architecture tested against human behavioral data as well as measures of SoC
- not only prediction-based (bottom up)

LEVELS OF CONTROL

- 1. sensorimotor control layer (SCL)
 - a predictive processing hierarchy (free energy)
- 2. cognitive control layer (CCL)
 - cognitive architecture ACT-R
- computationally model of SoC
- arises from
 - conforming, deviating or conflicting prediction errors
 - precision in visual, acoustic & tactile information input modalities

VERENA VANESSA HAFNER Tool-use and agency in artificial agents



COMPUTATIONAL PREDICTIVE MODEL OF A MINIMAL SELF: SENSE OF AGENCY & SENSE OF BODY OWNERSHIP

Review. Neural Computation (2021) 33 (5): 1402-1432.



 \rightarrow e.g., imbalance between predicted & perceived information

GREGOR SCHÖNER, JAN TEKÜLVE A neural dynamic account of intentionality as the basis of an active self



DYNAMIC FIELD THEORY

intention

- 2 direction of fit
 - 1. world to mind
 - 2. mind to world

scenario:

intentional agent in simple world

- world (colored objects (small) | paint buckets (tall) | vehicle with arm)
- perception (see color/feature | sense position, arm | paint in gripper)
- intention in action (move / reach to take up paint | reach to apply a coat of paint)

CONCLUSION

- intentional states = neural attractors
 - emerging & disappearing through instabilities controlled by conditions of satisfaction
 - neural dynamic architectures organize intentional processes across 2 directions of fit & 6 psychological modes
 - neural dynamics scales due to the stability → robustness properties of neural attractors



Dynamic Thinking

MARTIN BUTZ

Homeostasis drives the active self while generative models constitute it



→ FREE ENERGY

minimization drives 3 types of inferences

- 1. retrospective in the here and how
- 2. retrospective & reflective
- 3. prospective



surprising causes of shadow





DEDRE GENTNER Analogy, abstraction and relational knowledge



EMBODIMENT

many human concepts • are learned & stored as sensorimotor traces

extreme embodiment all concepts are embodied •

ABSTRACT ACCOUNT

structural forms as hypothesis space

extreme abstract account learning = hypothesis testing •

ABSTRACT RELATIONAL CONCEPTS

- formed from embodied experience!
- via analogical comparison
- via structural alignment & mapping

3-YEARS-OLDS LEARNING A NEW SPATIAL RELATION VIA ONE OR TWO EXAMPLES

8 unfamiliar relations -- each given a novel label







(Christie & Gentner 2010)

There is a continuum of abstractness from strongly sensorimotor concepts to highly abstract concepts

Abstract concepts—including many relational concepts—often evolve from sensorimotor concepts

This evolution is driven by analogical abstraction processes

early in infancy

structure-mapping abilities acquiring language

> analogical abilities

individual learning & language evolution

metaphoric language as a route to new abstractions both



TRISTAN BAUMANN, HANSPETER A. MALLOT Gateway identity & spatial remapping in a combined grid & place cell attractor



HUMANS CAN REASON ABOUT SPACE \rightarrow THERE MUST BE SPATIAL REPRESENTATIONS



place & grid cells \rightarrow context-specific firing fields

- context change is signaled by remapping
- remapping happens immediately when another room is entered
- patters depend on local position information (at the entrance)
 - Gateways between rooms must play a special role

CHRISTIAN GUMBSCH, GEORG MARTIUS, MARTIN V. BUTZ Learning latent event codes for hierarchical prediction & generalization





RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORK



GATED RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORK



GateLORD punishes the network for gate opening → Loss function → better in prediction & generalization



NICOLAS KUSKE, FLORIAN RÖHRBEIN, JULIEN VITAY, MARCO RAGNI, FRED HAMKER Demands & potentials of different levels of neuro-cognitive models for human spatial cognition

- 2 levels of model organization in order to understand cognition
 - 1. neurocomputional (too complex?)
 - 2. algorithmic (so simple Too abstract?)
- DUAL PROCESS
 - 1. declarative planning DP
 - 2. procedural habitual PH

ACT- R adaptive control of thought rational cognitive architecture





CHRISTOPH VON DER MALSBURG, BENJAMIN GREWE, THILO STADELMANN Making sense of the natural environment

- structured network patterns as symbol
- object / schema
- texture representation
 - by feature neurons??
 - NO by net fragments
 - constitute Gestalt laws



	feature neurons	net fragments
relationship	association	structural relationship
	bags of features / Hebbian assemblies	building blocks
		symbolic & sub symbolic representation
structured by		learning& self-organization

NET FRAGMENTS = brain spanning nets constitutes mental life

EVA WIESE, YASMINA GIEBELER

Robots as social agents: challenges and insights from social neuroscience

SOCIAL AGENTS - PHYSICAL APPEARANCE

SOCIAL AGENTS - CHALLENGES

- prior experiences
- mental models
- social Al
- content & environment
- measurement
- development

FFA BOLPHIC ACC

SOCIAL AGENTS - FUNCTIONAL ROLE

- intuitive dialogue
- reduced workload
- social learning
- transparency & trust
- positive affect
- integration

Social agents - social networks in the brain

- Mirroring Networks
- underactivated mentalizing networks
- underactivated face-recognition networks

two studies				
social attention	Wiese et al 2012			
drainage of cognitive resources	Wiese et al. 2018			

MARTIN MAIER, ALEXANDER LEONHARDT, RASHA ABDEL RAHMAN Bad robots? Humans rapidly attribute mental states during the perception of robot faces

INTERACTING WITH ROBOTS WE SWITCH BETWEEN THE DESIGN & INTENTIONAL STANCE



Trustworthinees		Before Info	After Info	
Ctory Volonce	Trustworthiness Rating	Expression Rating	1	negneupos
Story valence Story valence	Story Valence	Story Va	alence	

		Results	
questionnaire	60 participants 36 robot images	 Ratings of trustworthiness & facial expression align with the valence of learned knowledge. 	
EEG pre- registration https:// osf.io/cBva7	30 participants 18 robot images	 Ratings of trustworthiness & facial expression align with the valence of learned knowledge. Intentionality: robots aren't rated as totally unintentionally BAD robots are rated acting more intentionally than GOOD or NEUTRAL robots 	



N170 component:

- early visual face perception
- early posterior negativity (EPN):
- reflexive response to emotional visual stimuli late positive potential (LPP):
- more elaborated evaluation of emotional stimuli