



THE 13TH



BIENNAL COLLECTIVE
INTENTIONALITY CONFERENCE

AUGUST 9-21, 2021



SOCIAL
ONTOLOGY
2021
UC SAN DIEGO

Memory slices by Anna Strasser
**DISCLAIMER: JUST MEMORIES – AIMING FOR CORRESPONDENCE
WITH REALITY BUT CANNOT GUARANTEE IT.**

Arto Laitinen	Bill Wringe and Dilara Boğa	René Reich-Graefe	Gregory Slack
Three Approaches to Social Ontology: Scientific, Participatory, and Critical	The Difference Armies Make	Socio-Philosophical Ontology: Supraorganic Emergence of Social Reality	The Medieval Origins of 'Race': The Importance of the Arab Slave Trade in Africa
Johan Brännmark	Tom Kaspers, Jacob LiBrizzi, Duccio Calosi, & Yoichi Kobe	Asya Passinsky	Anastasiia D. Grigoreva
Structural Injustice for Ontological Individualists	De Mortuis Nil Nisi Bonum	Is Social Construction Grounding?	Catcalling as dispositional misogyny: Locating catcalling within the discourse on patriarchy-enforcing speech
Mattias Gunnemyr	Oliver Massin & Kathrin Koslicki	Megan Kitts	Daniel C. Friedman
Causation and Collective Harms: Non-causal Responses to the Inefficacy Argument	A Plea for Descriptive Social Ontology	On the Familiarity of Moral Dilemmas: Against the Normative Implications from the Dual-Process Theory of Morality	Epistemic Interdependence: Understanding Shared Inquiry
Ludovica Adamo	Matthew J. Cull	Jaime Castillo-Gamboa	
Hierarchical Group Agency and Legitimacy: The Delegation Theory of Legitimate Political Authority		Vagueness and Arbitrariness in Social Ontology	
Kenneth Silver	Sex Selection and Adaptive Preferences: Improving the Bargaining Position of Reasonable Agents Under Structures of Oppression	KEYNOTE	
Metaphysics Incorporated		Michael Hardimon The Idea of Systemic Racism	

*Monday,
9.8.2021*

The Difference Armies Make

Dilara Boža
Bill Wringer

NON-COMBATANT IMMUNITY (NCI)

Members of the military can be liable to defensive lethal harms when civilians are not!

This does not depend on an asymmetry in blameworthiness between combatants and non-combatants!



pizza principle:

ALLOCATING X, THE MORE PEOPLE YOU HAVE TO ALLOCATE IT TO, THE LESS X EVERYONE GETS

	Purposes	Plausible constraints	pizza principle
BLAME	establishing moral responsibility / education / solidarity with victims	fairness / minimize future harm & harms from stigmatization	NO
LIABILITY	absorb & allocate costs of repair of or defense against morally significant costs	fairness, minimization of future harm, avoidance of moral hazard, completeness	YES

BLAMEWORTHY DOESN'T ESTABLISH THAT THEY ARE LIABLE

Three Approaches to Social Ontology: Scientific, Participatory, and Critical

- Scientific (naturalistic) approach: science is the measure of things. "Folk" assumptions are dubious; dropped if no scientific backing.
- Participatory approach: what is needed as a participant in everyday life should not be dropped (against scientific naturalism).

Critical approach: emancipatory aims → some everyday views have to be dropped as oppressive, dogmatic ...

- a complement to participatory view

Scientific	Participatory	Critical, emancipatory
Social kinds as natural kinds: prediction and explanation (Guala, Greenwood,...)	Attribute joint decisions, intentions, responsibility (Gilbert, Searle, Tuomela, Bratman,...)	Pursue social justice, engage in social critique (Race, gender; Haslanger, Ásta)

investigate phenomena scientifically

- folk understanding needs scientific backings

attribute phenomena

- folk understanding plays an important role

criticize the way phenomena are constructed



Arto Laitinen

CRITICIZING PREVAILING FOLK UNDERSTANDINGS, BUT DOES NOT SHARE THE AIM AT PARSIMONY OR CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS AS THE END POINT

Structural Injustice for Ontological Individualists

ANTI-INDIVIDUALISTS (Young / Haslanger):

- structural injustices not sufficiently recognized as real problems due to individualistic ontology (social facts = facts about individuals)

→ ABANDON ONTOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM

saving individualist ontology & consider structural injustices

➤ abandon statism

structural injustices can be understood in terms of distributions over individuals, but with a more inclusive account of the relevant rights, resources, and risks

➤ abandon the idea that for every injustice there is some specific agent wholly responsible



Johan Brännmark

We don't have to give up the idea of individual responsibility!

Hierarchical Group Agency and Legitimacy: The Delegation Theory of Legitimate Political Authority

OPEN NORMATIVE QUESTIONS REGARDING LARGE-SCALE, JOINT ACTIVITIES

Is it legitimate for states to plan for their subjects?

delegation theory of the legitimacy of political authority
political authorities are legitimate when they

- provide their subjects with **adequate plans** that respond to reasons, and when
- subjects delegate their planning powers to the authority

individual practical reasoning functions: Intentions & plans motivate individuals to act by giving them reasons for action

legal case:

states (political societies =large-scale, hierarchical group agency) can plan for their subjects, organising & coordinating the subjects' behaviour to make them act as the authority ordered

→ large-scale, social coordination

It does not follow from the fact that states can better achieve that coordination, that it is legitimate for them to do so.

ANSWER TO A NORMATIVE QUESTION ABOUT AUTHORITY THROUGH THE THEORY OF ACTION

for an authority to be legitimate and for subjects to have an obligation to obey its laws:

- authority needs to provide adequate plans that respond to reasons
- subjects need to delegate their planning powers to the authority



Ludovica Adamo

What counts as an adequate plan?

Metaphysics Incorporated



Kenneth Silver

CORPORATIONS = A PIECE WITH ENTITIES OF BROADER APPEAL WITHIN SOCIAL ONTOLOGY BUT NOT GROUPS??

- identified with some plurality (their employees or shareholders perhaps)
- reify them as distinct entities and responsible group agents

BUT

corporations are neither **essentially groups** nor **legal entities**

→ corporations can exist without groups of people or indeed a strict legal apparatus

- it is a mistake to think that there is corporate mentality and responsibility
- difficult to imagine how firms can be embodied in the world

best way of understanding the distinctive character of corporations is to appreciate the importance of the firm's assets

CORPORATIONS:=

artifacts constituted by their assets, where assets themselves are complex and undertheorized financial phenomena



- explains the connection between firms and groups of people and to the legal infrastructure
- provides a means of unifying firms across heterogeneous types of corporations, of specifying their persistence conditions, and of exploring the conditions of corporate agency

Socio-Philosophical Ontology: Supraorganic Emergence of Social Reality

TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF SUPRAORGANIC EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL REALITY

- causally underpinning all instances of sociolegal emergence
 - sociolegal rules and practices in terms of legal-system social institutions (e.g., first-tier legal recognition and organization of businesses as partnerships and corporations)
 - legal-system social laws (e.g., second-tier legal recognition and organization of certain intra-business fiduciary duties among business owners and managers)

To understand how law emerges, we require a theoretical understanding of how overall social reality emerges and how the existents of social reality come to exist.



René Reich-Graefe

1. If law should be a given society's primary tool to engineer and regulate social justice after all else fails,
2. If there is never an "end of history" for the legal and non-legal social organization of human cooperation and welfare production,

THEN we need a better understanding of the social world for the success of any future positive social-capital project aimed at improving

→ radically rethink social emergence in supraorganic terms, and, as a consequence, also rejects the near-universal acceptance (and shared ontological prior) of **methodological individualism** in the social and sociolegal sciences

Is Social Construction Grounding?

ANALYZE CONSTITUTIVE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION IN TERMS OF THE NOTION OF METAPHYSICAL GROUND

BUT: *The existence of the singleton of the Supreme Court is grounded in the social.
Yet the existence of singleton Supreme Court is not socially constructed.*



Asya Passinsky

CHALLENGE:

Identify what distinguishes genuine cases of social construction from other cases of grounding in the social

(i) appeal to the grounds

- *grounded in distinctive social patterns* (Schaffer 2017)
- Ø Not general enough to encompass some genuine cases of social construction.

(ii) appeal to the grounded

- *partially grounded in certain features of social reality.* (Griffith 2018)
- Ø Not general enough to encompass some genuine cases of social construction.
- *Essentialists*
- Ø Appeals to the notion of essence, as well as the controversial idea that essences can have grounds.

social

(iii) appeal to the grounding relation

- *variety of grounding involved*
- Ø *Virtue of integration is jeopardized; seems like a re-labeling of the problem rather than a solution.*

(iv) appeal to the meta-grounds

A fact p is socially constructed just in case there are some facts q_1, \dots, q_n which together fully ground p and there is some distinct social fact r which at least partially grounds the relevant grounding fact, viz. the fact that q_1, \dots, q_n ground p .

Epistemic Interdependence: Understanding Shared Inquiry



Daniel C. Friedman

When do we count sth. as inquiring together, and how should we inquire together?

Individualist Account of shared inquiry

metaphysical: ... when we both work towards answering the same question

normativ: ... as we would were we inquiring alone, perhaps in such a way as to not hinder one another

BUT individualist account fails to offer the proper verdict concerning 'hijacked inquiry'

INTERDEPENDENCE ACCOUNT OF SHARED INQUIRY

illuminating basic structure & crucial guiding norms

- shared inquiry = a kind of joint action with a distinctive set of aims (*answering a question correctly in an epistemic-state improving way*)

- norms marking certain behaviors as improper at certain points of shared inquiry, on the basis of pressures towards sharing and making compatible inquirers' reasons

→ AREA WORTHY OF SUSTAINED FOCUS AT THE INTERSECTION OF NORMATIVE EPISTEMOLOGY AND SHARED ACTION
→ FOCUS ON THE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF OUR EPISTEMIC INTERDEPENDENCE

The Idea of Systemic Racism



Systemic Racism:=
form of racism that consists in the systemic (structural) oppression of a racialized group to the social, economic, and political advantage of another

- a complex form of racism that comprehends other, independently defined, forms of institutional racism

CONSTITUTIVE SENSE:

- Institution's goals / rules and roles / application of its procedures are racist

DISPARATE OUTCOMES SENSE

- Race-neutral policy has a significant adverse impact on a racialized group

STRUCTURAL SENSE

- Two or more institutions operate in a combined way to disadvantage members of a racialized group.

Can an institution be racist despite the fact that none of its <i>current</i> officers are racist?	Can an institution be racist without its being the case that the institution's racism can be traced back historically to the racism of individual agents?
<p>YES BUT:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> awareness → <i>indifference racism</i> unawareness → being subject to a racist ideology (e.g., colorblind racism) 	<p>YES</p> <p>because of its goals, rules, and role criteria, the institution's racism</p>
YES	NO
YES	NO

SYSTEMIC RACISM IS HUGEY IMPORTANT

- more explanatory of persisting racial inequalities than individual racism and of greater moral concern
- **The concept is an indispensable discursive tool in the struggle against racial inequality.**

*Tuesday,
10.8.2021*

Jan Jonáš	
Social nature of banking corporation, a case study of economic transformation in the Czech Republic during the 1990s	
Thomas J. Spiegel	Björn Petersson
Parasocial Relationships and Loneliness – A Phenomenological Approach	Group Morality and Moral Groups. Ethical Aspects of the Tuomelian We-mode
Vojtěch Zachník	Stanisław Jędrszak
Attitude-based Account of Social Institutions	On Practical Institutional Presuppositions. A Case for Hybrid Ontology
Daniel Sharp	Teresa Marques
Exit, Equality, and the Constitution of State Power	Misogyny is the hatred of women
Thomas Brouwer	Michael Davin
Social Metaontology: Fun with Hyperplans	Gender and Reification: reading Sally Haslanger as a Marxist-feminist
Muhammad Ali Khalidi	
Social Ontology and Linguistic Reclassification	
Sahar Heydari Fard	Anna Ujlaki
Is Collective Responsibility a Useful Fiction? Lessons from Social Movements Research	Political Obligation and Migration
Jared S. Oliphint	Matthew Congdon
More Work for Social Ontology	Are Moral Facts Loopy?
Lasha Matiashvili	
Phenomenology of Affective Sharing in Constitution of Liturgical “We”.	
Jane Loo	
We make the groups	

Social nature of banking corporation, a case study of economic transformation in the Czech Republic during the 1990s




Jan Jonáš

LAWSON'S SOCIAL ONTOLOGY (SOCIAL REALITY, CORPORATION, MONEY) APPLIED ON THE SOCIO-ONTIC NATURE OF THE CZECH BANKING CORPORATION AFTER THE TRANSFORMATION FROM A CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMY TO A MARKET ONE TOOK PLACE
economic restructuring → significant social change

- semi-structured interviews → enable an understanding of the concepts of social ontology through the lived experience of the participants themselves
- reflections from interviews are complemented with stylized facts from contemporary media and scientific literature.

1. methods: mixture of social ontology with memory studies/oral history.
2. processual understanding, via lived experience, of theoretically and statically depicted social ontology concepts
3. application regarding the nature of the corporation & money



- 1) Social positioning of banks within community – generally the same
- 2) Rights and obligations – major change in relations to private enterprises; and to the government
- 3) Accepted function – major changes from purely administrative credit to accountability for credit; and from subordination to government command to government regulation

Parasocial Relationships and Loneliness

A Phenomenological Approach



Thomas J. Spiegel

MODERN FORMS OF PARASOCIAL RELATIONS EXACERBATE LONELINESS

driving factors of social atomization: technologization & digitalization

PARASOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

one person featured in a (mass) medium & one other person consuming and interacting with this mediated presence
(lopsided & assymetric)

- traditional: e.g. believer's relation to a deity /TV host ...
- modern: e.g. Instagram or Twitter



LONELINESS

secondary, yet fundamental existential condition of being human which consists in the absence of the second person

- pretending to traverse the 'gulf' between 1st & 2nd person
- do not feature the 2nd person
- never puposeless (monetary gain / ego bosting)



The basic word I-Thou can be spoken only with one's whole being. The concentration and fusion into a whole being can never be accomplished by me, can never be accomplished without me. I require a Thou to become; becoming I, I say Thou.

— Martin Buber —

AZ QUOTES

connection between loneliness & totalitarianism

“What prepares men for totalitarian domination in the non-totalitarian world is the fact that loneliness, once a borderline experience usually suffered in certain marginal social conditions like old age, has become an everyday experience of the ever-growing masses of our century.” (Arendt 1973, 478)



Group Morality and Moral Groups

Ethical Aspects of the Tuomelian We-mode



Björn Petersson

Raimo Tuomela's we-mode groups

- partly characterized by norms restricting a member's right to leave the group without permission

Corlett & Lyons Strobel 2017:

- implausible ethical implications concerning the rights and autonomy of members in we-mode groups

- BUT this worry vanishes, if one refers to a plausible interpretation of Tuomela's notion of social normativity and a reasonable precisification of the notion of autonomy in this context.

BUT STILL Tuomela's general silence on the nature of moral normativity makes it unclear how his distinction between SOCIAL AND MORAL NORMATIVITY should be drawn more precisely.

MORAL NORMATIVITY

- just a species of social normativity
- applied to, and/or grounded in, larger collectives?

- Admittedly, this does not seem to be what Tuomela has in mind in the few places where he refers to ethics or morality in the general sense, e. g. as "Kantian".

→ exploring briefly with the aid of resources available within a broadly Tuomelian framework

On Practical Institutional Presuppositions

A Case for Hybrid Ontology



Stanisław Jędrzak

Do social artifacts really exist or are they just useful fictions, and if they exist, are there any metaphysical criteria of their identity understood in a narrow sense?

JOHN SEARLE: e.g. institutions = systems of constitutive rules

→ partially affirmative answer: universally accepted institutional facts presuppose the existence of certain institutions

BUT Searle's suggestion is vague & too general to be operative.

INSTITUTIONAL REALISM HYPOTHESIS

- normative meaning of institutional discourse in terms of rights and obligations
- institutions should be considered as real according to the practical identity of rational agents

→ CHRISTINE KORSGAARD: practical identity

- individual beliefs: in the absence of them an agent would have no rational reasons to act
- civic identity – the fact that one is a subject of rights and obligations – presupposes the existence of institutions

advantages.... the criterion

1. links personal identity to the existence of social institutions
2. allows to determine a timeframe of the existence of a given institution
3. can be graded
4. associates ontological investigations with sociological research

SOME INSTITUTIONS HAVE NO SUCH PRACTICAL, FOUNDATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE → ACCEPT FICTIONALISM

Misogyny is the hatred of women



Teresa Marques

DEFINITION: Misogyny = hatred of women

OBJECTION of Kate Manne (*argued against this view, which she called “naïve”*)

- points to an epistemic and an explanatory challenge
- proposes to ameliorate the term

OBJECTION TO THE OBJECTION

1. challenges that Manne raises are not compelling to motivate a meaning revision
2. psychology of emotions can offer
 - resources to account for long standing dispositional sentiments
 - resources to account for the hatred of women in accordance with the standard understanding of the meaning of the word

not all harms are cases of misogyny

CONCLUSION

**PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTIONS OFFERS A PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION OF
MISOGYNY AND ITS SOCIAL FUNCTION**

Social Metaontology: Fun with Hyperplans



Thomas Brouwer

SOCIAL ONTOLOGY: ARTICULATE METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES STRUCTURING & EXPLAINING SOCIAL REALITY & EXPLAIN HOW SUCH PRINCIPLES COME ABOUT

Searle: social facts to be structured & explained by constitutive rules, which are in turn explained as arising from collective acceptances

Epstein: 'grounding enquiry' & 'anchoring enquiry'

UNANSWERED BACKGROUND 'HOW POSSIBLE' QUESTION:

How could it be that anything we do has the force of putting into place a metaphysical principle?

→ regard this as a metaontological question that first-order social-ontological theories can reasonably skirt around **OR HAVE FUN WITH HYPERPLAN SETS**

POPULATION-LEVEL HYPERPLAN SETS

→ *Jenkins (2020)*:

connection between the nature of social facts & (constraints on) behaviour

→ formal-semantic gizmo for modelling constraints on action

- associate populations with hyperplan sets
- model accumulated constraints on behaviour arising from norms, conventions and customs

if you want to be a realist ...

individual HYPERPLAN SETS from Gibbard (2003) applied on a POPULATION-LEVEL

- provide a rich semantic resource
 1. constraints on behaviour regarding particular objects
 - *characterise the content of social properties*
 2. conditions triggering a given treatment
 - *derive principles connecting social properties to instantiation (or grounding) conditions*
(= *principles recognisably of the sort that first-order social-ontological theories articulate*)

→ NON-MYSTERIOUS ABILITY TO PUT IN PLACE COMMUNAL CONSTRAINTS ON BEHAVIOUR DEMYSTIFIES OUR ABILITY TO PUT IN PLACE METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES FOR SOCIAL REALITY

Is Collective Responsibility a Useful Fiction?

Lessons from Social Movements Research



Sahar Heydari Fard

COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY DEBATES OFTEN HINGE ON PUTATIVELY EMPIRICAL CLAIMS ABOUT GROUPS' WORKINGS & THE CAUSAL EFFICACY OF CONTESTED ENTITIES INTEGRATIVE PROJECT

history of social movement research: favors a kind of fictionalism about collective responsibility

1: Treating social movements as collective agents is methodologically unsound.

several methodological problems

- positing collective goals obscured variation in movement members' individual goals
 - failed to capture unintended but beneficial outcomes
 - did not identify successful movements' causes
 - insensitive to how & when movement's goals change over time
 - conflated different effects of a movement

2: It is useful to talk as if social movements are collective agents who are responsible for certain social outcomes.

3: Fictionalism provides a fruitful way of reconciling the empirical liabilities with the moral and social advantages that come with treating social movements as collective agents capable of responsibility.

- fictionalism's advantages relative to both realism and eliminativism about collective agency and responsibility,
- our methodology illustrates the benefits that a more empirically informed social ontology provides for moral, social, and political philosophy

More Work for Social Ontology

3 significant features of objects are agent-dependent or social:

boundaries

number

kind membership



Jared S. Oliphint

IMPLICATIONS

→ more objects than we may have thought turn out to be social objects

→ these features help to clarify two metaphysical puzzles

problem of material constitution

the problem of the many

APPLICATIONS WIDEN THE SCOPE OF SOCIAL ONTOLOGY, CREATING
NEW AVENUES OF RESEARCH AND MORE WORK FOR THE FIELD

Phenomenology of Affective Sharing in Constitution of Liturgical “We”.



Lasha Matiashvili

ROLE OF COLLECTIVE AFFECTIVE INTENTIONAL STATES IN CERTAIN RELIGIOUS RITUALS & PRACTICES REMAINS LARGELY OVERLOOKED

collective intentionality :

conative paradigms

cognitive paradigms

affective aspect

CONSTITUTIVE FUNCTION OF AFFECTIVITY FOR RELIGIOUS COMMUNION OR FOR “WE-MODE” OF LITURGICAL PRACTICE

liturgical practices

- create interpersonal affective atmosphere opening the horizon for getting closer to the divine
- constitutes special kind of communal identity, members of which are united not only by shared beliefs, but they are intrinsically bound together by sharing affective moods, attunement and atmosphere.

liturgical “We”:

- share belief system & emotions
- free from instrumental goal oriented rationalism
- some kind of “inner bond” & “feeling of togetherness”

Dietrich von Hildebrand on Affective Liturgical We



“Liturgy and Personality”: **contra**: dominant idea of communal liturgical prayer as being less affective / **pro**: liturgy embodies intense and true affectivity

Conclusions

- ▶ In contrast to universalized theological paradigm of “We” or phenomenological fusion account, I assume that for sharing certain emotional experience, in that case in liturgical practice, the minimal requirement is an awareness and acknowledgment of the presence of others.
- ▶ In liturgical practice, during the common prayer and performing of chants there is some kind of collective affective intentional directedness to sacred, which is not phenomenally given and rationalized but felt as if it is present among each of them.
- ▶ Contrary to communitarian account, I state that “You” does not exist and is not phenomenally given without “I” and “You” is always already an “I”. Overcoming of barriers does not necessarily imply an elimination of difference between God and man, between “I” and “Ihou”.
- ▶ For sharing some affective experience two following criterias are need: Co-presence of subjects, and reciprocal intentional directedness to each other and finding oneself in collective affective atmosphere. Sharing does not amount to unification and elimination of difference between I and You.
- ▶ Therefore, each subject in liturgy experience certain emotion independently as well as together with others and thus they are interdependent upon each other.

- Shared affective experiences can constitute liturgical “we”
- Communities represent certain solid foundation for its members and are prior to and precede an “I”

We make the groups



Jane Loo

OBJECTIVE GROUP IDENTITY : NECESSARY & SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR SYNCHRONIC & DIACHRONIC GROUP IDENTITY

(Effingham, 2010; Epstein 2019; Ritchie, 2013, 2015, 2020)

Objective group identity plays an important role in our lives:

- day-to-day functioning of society depends on the objective identity of governments, nations, corporations, and other such organisations.

BUT we may sometimes disagree about a group's identity (Greenwood, 2020)

→ disputes cannot always be adjudicated by appealing to objective group identity

→ a subjectivist account of group identity can explain the disputes while still remaining compatible with objective group identity

augmenting objective group identity → subjective group identity dependent on the person considering a group

SUBJECTIVIST FIRST-PERSON ACCOUNT OF GROUP IDENTITY:

- group's identity is in part dependent on a person's desires
- we "form" groups in our minds → resultant group is dependent on our knowledge of the objective facts about the group and our subjective biases

*Wednesday,
11.8.2021*

SYMPOSIUM - Epistemology of Groups	
Jennifer Lackey, Margaret Gilbert, Lukas Schwengerer, Kirk Ludwig, Leo Townsend	Torsten Menge Power's Expressive Role and the "Essential Contestedness" of Social Ontology
	Niels de Haan Collective Culpable Ignorance
	Niko Popow Counter-Norms
	Jack Bissett
	What is a Social Group? Adjudicating the Plural View and Ritchie's Structural Ontology
Michael Wilby	Jack Bissett
The Functions of Joint Attention	What is a Social Group? Adjudicating the Plural View and Ritchie's Structural Ontology
Kirk Ludwig	
Forward Looking Collective Responsibility and the Problem of Shifting Burdens	
Abe Roth	Laura Wildemann Kane
Entitlement to reasons for action	Examining the Nuance of Social Reality
Nathalie Morasch	Randall Westgren
Same-Saying Survives Amelioration	Don't Knock Away That Ladder!
Suddhasatwa Guharoy	
Trust and Social Roles	
Andrew Tsz Wan Hung	Richard Stopford
Taylor and Rousseau on Republicanism and Political Fragmentation: A Social Ontological Perspective	Butler, 'Sex' and 'Critical Realism'

OXFORD

SYMPOSIUM

the epistemology of groups

JENNIFER LACKEY

EPISTEMOLOGY OF GROUPS

- Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern University)
- Margaret Gilbert (UC Irvine)
- Kirk Ludwig (Indiana University Bloomington)
- Lukas Schwengerer (University of Duisburg-Essen)
- Leo Townsend (University of Vienna)



IN DEFENSE OF THE JOINT COMMITMENT ACCOUNT OF COLLECTIVE BELIEF




Margaret Gilbert


joint commitment account

- neither correlativist nor summative / allows for the determination of the content of a group's belief by a proper subset of the members
- allows that a group's belief may be determined by a set of "operative members" who do not comprise the whole group

→ groups can lie and bullshit



because of what is at stake financially, the official position of Philip Morris is that smoking is neither highly addictive nor detrimental to one's health, which is then published in all of their advertising materials



With a smile, Jill nods in agreement. Jack & Jill secretly exchange a wink and a smile.

Lackey wants collective belief to be something good.

I want to understand what people have in mind when they ascribe beliefs to us, collectively, or to a particular group as such.

It would not be surprising, in light of this, if our accounts of collective belief should diverge

Comment by Lukas Schwengerer

GROUP EPISTEMOLOGY: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF HOLDING GROUPS ACCOUNTABLE



JAA: JOINT ACCEPTANCE ACCOUNTS OF GROUP JUSTIFICATION

reasons (for evidence) for a belief that p are formed by joint acceptance of all group members

- → reasons are under the control of the group

Lackey: IF groups can arbitrarily form evidence THEN they can decide how much justification they have for any belief at will.

What is going wrong?

IGNORING EVIDENCE

- each group member believes p
- nobody is willing to accept that this is a reason for the group to believe p



FABRICATING EVIDENCE

- each member has evidence for p
- all members jointly accept some piece of evidence for non-p
- the group has a justified belief that non-p

INTUITIONS

- group is doing sth. wrong (morally & epistemically)
- group is not justified in its doxastic states
- justification loses its connection to the world – not truth-conducive! → Illegitimate manipulation of evidence problem [Lackey]

→ JAA IS WRONG

DILEMMA

1st horn: joint acceptance grounds justification & we have illegitimate manipulation of evidence

2nd horn: jointly accepted evidence must be good evidence & give up on JAA

NORMATIVE DEFEATER

- identify illegitimate evidence
- mismatch between the evidence the group has and the evidence it should have → group has a normative defeater and its ultima facie justification is decreased

e.g. ignoring evidence & fabricating evidence decreases justification

What determines which evidence a group should have?

- again the 2nd horn?? – sth. about the group members and their evidences
- justification must be somehow anchored to the group members


JJA COULD CENTER ON PRIMA FACIE JUSTIFICATION

Group Assertion Revisited



Kirk Ludwig

STATUS ROLE/FUNCTION ACCOUNT OF GROUP



JL's Objections

Collective acceptance of someone as the spokesperson for a group

- **by the potential audience** is not necessary
- **by its members** is not necessary

acceptance might play a role :

- *I may propose using a tube of toothpaste as a king in playing chess with you; but if you don't go along, the tube of toothpaste is a king **in intent but not in fact.***

PLURALIST ACCOUNT:

Explicitly/implicitly granting authority to someone to be a spokesperson.

- tradition or inheritance
- non-objection
- some "moral or fundamental" principle
- seizure

STATUS ROLE/FUNCTION ACCOUNT IS COMPATIBLE WITH JL'S OFFICIAL POSITION & CAN BE THOUGHT OF AS A USEFUL SUPPLEMENT TO JL'S ACCOUNT.

- provides a reductive account of the authority of the spokesperson
- flexible enough to accommodate the cases that JL raises as objections (that should be accommodated)

The Functions of Joint Attention



Michael Wilby

ROLES OF JOINT ATTENTION

- (a) Social Development (esp. linguistic development)
- (b) Communication and Reference
- (c) **Joint Action**



e.g. hunting

functions of joint attention

- referential (awareness of the object)
- transparency (joint action awareness)
- conceptual (joint awareness of a token object)

enable joint attention to act as an interface between the world, other people, and their shared plans

+ **Tripartite Function:** JA functions to provide agents with a reason to coordinate at a particular time and place, with respect to a particular object, by way of a transparent joint awareness of that object, and where coordinating with respect to that object would successfully execute a commonly known prior shared intention.

+ There is a 'joint attentional triangle' that involves a three-place experiential relation: Person A, Person B, Object C.

+ Person A and Person B 'enter into' each others' experience, not as another object, but as a *co-subjects*.

~~+ (a) **Rich Cognitivism:** Fails to satisfy the Transparency Function.~~


~~+ (b) **Enactivism:** Fails to satisfy the Referential Function.~~

RICH RELATIONAL VIEW

shared experience is individuated by the fact that the agents

- are jointly attending to the same object,
- are (transparently) jointly attending to the object **in the same way**

Relationalism



~~+ Lean Relationalism can deal with the *Referential* and *Transparency* Functions.~~

~~+ However, it has a problem with the *Conceptual Function*.~~

A & B are [jointly attending to C] → intensional
 A & B are [jointly attending] to C → extensional

Forward-Looking Collective Responsibility and the Problem of Shifting Burdens



Kirk Ludwig

Overabundance of helpers:

... no more than m ($<n$) could make effective contributions.

Pure overdetermination:

... more people can contribute than are needed and additional contributions beyond the minimum required make no difference to the outcome.

Many hands make light work:

... if everyone contributes the burden is lessened on each but in which fewer can do the job though their contributions must increase.



obligation to collectivize to help, includes to solve the problem of the division of labor


TWO PUZZLES

Others not doing their moral duty should not place *moral* demands on us that significantly affect our life prospects.

A real world case

- Over 800 million people face chronic food deprivation.
- Estimates of the cost of ending world hunger range from \$7 billion to \$265 billion a year (USD).
- There are ~5.5 billion people in the world over 18.
- Per person contributions to meet the need on a yearly basis, excluding the 800 million who face chronic food deprivation, ranges from \$1.49 to \$56.38.

Contributors	Yearly Amount
4,700,000,000	\$ 56.38
4,000,000,000	\$ 66.25
3,000,000,000	\$ 88.33
2,000,000,000	\$ 132.50
1,000,000,000	\$ 265.00
500,000,000	\$ 530.00
250,000,000	\$ 1,060.00
150,000,000	\$ 1,766.67
50,000,000	\$ 5,300.00
25,000,000	\$ 10,600.00
10,000,000	\$ 26,500.00
1,000,000	\$ 265,000.00
500,000	\$ 530,000.00
100,000	\$ 2,650,000.00



- If it would THEN we have to determine*
- where the threshold is beyond which we are not morally required to make contributions in order to fulfill our collective moral responsibilities when moral free riders place extra burdens on us.
- and to explain*
- the moral ground for drawing the line where we do.

*Thursday,
12.8.2021*


Corrado Piroddi	
Can Critical Theory Work Without the Concept of 'Ideology'?	
Tomasz Jativa	
Hegel's Views on History of Philosophy as a Social Ontology of Knowledge	
Joshua Habgood-Coote Collective Action, Work, and Partial Plans	Kenneth Mark Ehrenberg An Artefactual Theory of Precedent
Richard Lauer & Kareem Khalifa Placeholder Realism About Race	Marcello Ruta False Beliefs About Social Entities and their Argumentative Irrelevance for the Intentionality – Debate in Social Ontology
Matt Chennells Open to change: Conceptualising commitment flexibility under uncertainty about the future	Maria Cahill Are Groups Valued by Law?
Jorge Luis Fabra-Zamora Law, Groups, and Legal Theory	Eric Wilkinson A Pragmatic Constraint on Nationhood
	Isaac Shur Problems of Parasocial Epistemology
Nicole Whalen Adam Smith and Richard Price: Two Republican Ideals of a Free Society of Equals	Nicholas Tebben Beliefs and Commitments in Collective Epistemology
Kate Phelan Standpoint Theory: Neither a Theory Nor a Method	Rachel K. Cooper Plural Subjects and Social kinds

Can Critical Theory Work Without the Concept of 'Ideology'?


ANALYZING PIERRE BOURDIEU'S CONCEPTS OF FIELD AND HABITUS, AS WELL AS HIS THEORY OF SOCIAL REPRODUCTION



Corrado Piroddi



Habitus as structuring structure: it functions as an individual GPS capable of orienting the strategic actions of agents in a **non-reflective, unintentional way**, but in harmony with the possibilities and objective limits imposed by the capital and social field



Pierre Bourdieu's perspective constitutes a valid theoretical candidate for developing a conception of domination that aims at going beyond the ideas of ideology and false consciousness.

«Every social process of production is at the same time a process of reproduction».
K. Marx 1976 [1886], p. 71.

Hegel's Views on History of Philosophy as a Social Ontology of Knowledge



HEGEL'S THEORY OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY SHOULD BE READ AS A HISTORICAL ONTOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

(1) Hegel's notion of philosophy as a social cognitive practice

cultural function: resolve contradiction between transcendental apriorism & historicism

social role: conceptual expression of the structures defining the logical conditions for the possibility for social practices, specific to a given historical epoch

→ architecture of Hegel's system & concept of the absolute
=> metaphilosophical consideration of the nature of the history of philosophy

→ **project of justification of knowledge based on its immanent historicity**

(2) philosophical positions structurally corresponds to the apriorical development of logical categories

- Doctrine of Being → period of Presocratic philosophy
- Doctrine of Essence → Classical Greek philosophy
- Doctrine of the Notion → modern philosophy



"philosophy is its time apprehended in thoughts"

(3) Hegel's understanding of his position

- result of the evolution of philosophical discourse
- a form of self-knowledge of modernity

Collective Action, Work, and Partial Plans



Joshua Habgood-Coote

Bratman 1992: sharp distinction between

SHARED CO-OPERATIVE ACTIVITY

- shared plan with some degree of flexible mutuality and interdependence of the plans of the participants in some activity

PRE-PACKAGED CO-OPERATION

- involves participants slotting into a predetermined form of co-operation involving minimal mutuality

Bratman

- focuses on small-scale, non-hierarchical, co-ordinated, and democratic collective actions
- role of division of labour in collective action is not focused on
- did not offer an account of the structures of agency involved in pre-packaged co-operation

DIVISION OF LABOR IS ESSENTIAL FEATURE OF JOINT ACTION

→ planning theory

- partial plan (Bratman 1987) ... interpersonal division of labour involved in collective action

shared co-operative activity & pre-packaged co-operation → spectrum of cases of partial plans with different levels of granularity

→ work under Capitalism (*involving a fine-grained partial plan for collective activity*)

- allows us to understand the features of degraded work highlighted by Braverman,
- highlights the continuities between work, other kinds of collective action, and intentional action

Placeholder Realism About Race

QUESTION ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF RACE & ITS ROLE AS A MEASURE IN SUCCESSFUL SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC STUDIES



social-scientific studies

- race is a cause of various inequalities
- rely operational definitions of racial concepts

philosophy: studies' success → infer race is real

BUT there is no investigation of how race is measured and how these measures license commitment to race's reality!

“measurement arguments.”

- arguments showing how operational definitions of race justify commitment to the existence of race
- hinge on independent lines of evidence converging on a single concept of race

BUT evidence shows how different operational definitions of race yield divergent empirical results or else are not independent of each other.

→ PLACEHOLDER REALISM ABOUT RACE

- can preserve realism about race in the wake of measurement arguments' failures
 - races are real and play a role in social-scientific investigation, but function as a placeholder for a combination of:
 - (a) an ontologically thin notion of race
 - (b) other social and psychological processes frequently do the explanatory heavy-lifting in social-scientific research
- race need not have a substantive biological or social ontology nor need race be a kind unto itself

RACE IS A THIN CONCEPT BUT STILL SCIENTIFICALLY RELEVANT

Social groups : a normative account



Jorge Luis Fabra-Zamora

Main Claims

- **Problems:** Do social groups exist? What are they?
- Main views: in line with the conception of social groups developed by Toumela (1995) and Thomasson (2019)
 - It distinguishes between **normative groups** and *feature groups* or classes (not unified, contra Ritchie).
 - Social Groups and practice-based are co-constitutive notions
 - There are *unstructured* groups (normative sets) and *structured groups* (normative systems) – contra Ritchie.
 - Groups can be nested into another groups
 - Groups can be constituted by *shared action* and by *concentrated social pressure*.

Problems of Parasocial Epistemology

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY & THE CONCEPT OF PARASOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS



parasocial relationships and their general implications on social epistemology

- central epistemological problems posed by parasocial relationships
 - prime sites for disagreement-reinforcement mechanisms, which are often epistemically harmful.
 - can undermine the value of expertise by obfuscating people's actual epistemic relationships with one another

DESPITE THE PROBLEMS POSED IN THIS PAPER, PARASOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS ARE VALUE-NEUTRAL AND THUS CONTAIN POTENTIAL TO AMELIORATE THE VERY PROBLEMS THEY CAN CAUSE

Beliefs and Commitments in Collective Epistemology

“GROUP BELIEFS” ARE OFTEN BEST UNDERSTOOD AS COMMITMENTS TO THE TRUTH OF A PROPOSITION, RATHER THAN AS PSYCHOLOGICAL STATES.



Nicholas Tebben

commitment = normative status (not psychological state)

- being committed to the truth of a proposition
→ one has to act and reason as though it is true

belief = psychological state

- believing a proposition is one way of endorsing knowledge

▪ I will remain agnostic about whether or not groups also have genuine beliefs.

PROBLEM:

groups & individual cannot manifest the same functional properties

- cannot not occupy the same mental states
- cannot believe the same propositions
- but can know that the same propositions are true

functionalism provides the best account of group minds

How is this possible? Knowledge requires commitment, not belief.

GROUPS MAY NOT BE CAPABLE OF BELIEVING THE SAME PROPOSITIONS AS INDIVIDUALS, BUT THEY ARE CAPABLE OF ENDORSING THEM.

*Friday,
13.8.2021*

Josef Mensik	Siiri Porkkala
Structure in the social ontology of Tony Lawson	Nonbinary genders in Ásta's conferralist framework
Gunnar Björnsson	Giulio Sciacca
Reasons for contributing to collective benefits	Are the Groups of Conspiracy Theorists Social Kinds?
Gerhard Thonhauser	Marta Jorba & Dan López de Sa
Defining Collective Emotions	Intersectionality as Emergence
Julian Davis	Michael Schmitz
Well-Intentioned Self-Delusion about Collective Goals	From we-mode to role-mode
Haixin Dang	J Robert G Williams
Group Belief Revision and Scientific Change	Bargaining to Group Consensus
Matthew Andler	
What is Masculinity?	
Aaron Griffith	Maryam Ebrahimi Dinani
Correspondence Truth and Social Reality	Social Institutions & Two Levels of Constitution
Susan Stark	
Reparations, Responsibility, and (white) Identity	
Anne Schwenkenbecher	Matt Dean
Group-based ignorance in corporations: Rio Tinto and the Juukan Gorge Disaster	Group Immortality
Saray Ayala-Lopez & Nadya Vasilyeva	D. T. Everhart
Generics are Fine	Hegemony and Heteronomy: Race and Otherness in Psychological and Theological Perspective

Reasons for contributing to collective benefits



Gunnar Björnsson

THE PUZZLE OF TELEOLOGICAL REASONS FOR MERE CONTRIBUTIONS

THE PUZZLE: *teleological reasons for individual mere contributions to the realization of the relevant end*

teleological reason:

reason identified as such in instrumental reasoning guided by a particular end

mere contributions:

action:= (i) contribution to that realization, i.e. part of why it came about, but (ii) made no significant difference

Drops of Water:

individually insignificant differences to the expected values of each of billions of lives

CLAIM:

solutions to the puzzle appealing to collective behavior fail

- ❖ reason to help bring about collective outcomes
 - teleological
 - BUT without being directly sensitive to how the contribution affects the outcome

problems:

1. teleological nature of the individual's reasons are unclear
2. We have the same teleological reasons for mere contributions absent group involvement
3. Contributions to effective group action sometimes seem to count for nil

WAY OUT:

Instrumental reasoning is guided by what we value, or find important, or care about.

1. simpler instrumental reasoning precedes overall assessments, guided by our pre-reflective attraction to actions that saliently contribute to processes leading to good outcomes
2. complex considerations of the extent to which various options realize these values, and the pursuit of the overall best option


Defining Collective Emotions

TERM COLLECTIVE EMOTION IS NOTORIOUSLY VAGUE DISCUSSING VARIOUS PHENOMENA



Gerhard Thonhauser

→ distinguish collective emotions from other phenomena



Most research on the collectivity of emotions in psychology & cognitive science deals with mechanisms of emotion transfer & emotional entrainment

philosophical debate usually deals with the types of intentionality that make an emotion collective.

very broad definition by Scheve & Ismer (2013)
“the synchronous convergence in affective responding across individuals towards a specific event or object.”

a taxonomy of different types of collective emotion	spreading	fusion	sharing	contagion	matching
same type of emotion	+	+	+	+	
same aboutness	+	+	+		+
awareness of plurality	+		+	+	+
sense of togetherness		+	+	+	+

Bargaining to Group Consensus



J Robert G Williams

GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS MUST REACH AN AGREEMENT ON "CONSENSUS" CREDENCES

ACCURACY: credences / truth values

- Pettigrew: accuracy-based foundations for group consensus
- ways of caring about accuracy → different standard methods of aggregating individual credences to reach group consensus

bargaining:
agree a division of labor

Nash's constraints → a good compromise

1. weak pareto
2. invariance under contraction
3. no asymmetry out without asymmetry in

→ exactly the agreement

maximizing below product satisfies all 3 conditions

$(\text{utility of } s \text{ for } A - \text{utility of } d \text{ for } A) * (\text{utility of } s \text{ for } B - \text{utility of } d \text{ for } B)$

BUT

foundations for Pettigrew's kind of approach presuppose interpersonal comparability of epistemic utility

→ a special case of a famously controversial principle

→ **Nash's bargaining approach to social choice offers a different criterion**

- a norm for choice among options in cases where utilities are incomparable
- @ group beliefs: objects of choice are the team attitudes themselves.
- Nash bargaining solutions predicts consensus credences that are not (in general) linear or geometrical averages of the group members' credences.


Saturday, 14.8.2021

<p>SYMPOSIUM Maj Tuomela, Gabriel Sandu, Raul Hakli, Pekka Mäkelä, Kaarlo Miller and Hans Bernhard Schmid In Memoriam: Raimo Tuomela</p>	<p>Cyril Velikanov Citizens as Affected Patients and as Concerned and Engaged Actors in a Democratic Decision-Making Process</p>
	<p>Eline Gerritsen Taking Conventions Seriously</p>
	<p>Majid D. Beni Cognitive-social basis of scientific practice</p>
	<p>Guido Löhr Directed Normativity in Joint Action</p>
	<p>Ryan Miller Naturalized Normative Political Unity</p>
<p>Matthew Turyn On the dispositional account of gender identity</p>	<p>Johnny Marques de Jesus Deliberative democracy as we-mode group agency</p>
<p>Geoffrey D Callaghan Implications of Weaponized Dissent in a Post-Truth World</p>	<p>Joshua Rust The Conferralist Account, Traditional Anchors, and the Social Ontology of the University</p>
<p>Zachary Auwerda Conferralism and Police Brutality</p>	
<p>Laura Nicoara Essence Without Membership for Gender Kinds</p>	



In Memoriam: Raimo Tuomela

founding figure of the research field of COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY



The theory of this book is based on a science-friendly philosophical naturalism, and is accordingly committed to the idea that major claims of the theory are at least indirectly and partially empirically testable. I accordingly prefer to treat individualism and collectivism not as ideologies but as competing approaches to the explanation of social phenomena, reformulated for my purposes under the guise of the I-mode/we-mode distinction.



Raul Hakli & Pekka Mäkelä & Kaarlo Miller

Raimo Tuomela (1940-2020)

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE |
HUMAN ACTION AND ITS
EXPLANATION | SOCIAL ACTION |
SOCIAL ONTOLOGY

UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL REALITY

→ difference between acting as a private person (I-MODE) & acting as a group member (WE-MODE)

more than 200 publications
MONOGRAPHS

- 2013 *Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents.*
- 2010 *The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View.*
- 2002 *The Philosophy of Social Practices: A Collective Acceptance View.*
- 2000 *Cooperation: A Philosophical Study.*
- 1995 *The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions.*
- 1985 *Science, Action, and Reality.*
- 1984 *A Theory of Social Action.*
- 1977 *Human Action and Its Explanation: A Study on the Philosophical Foundations of Psychology.*
- 1973 *Theoretical Concepts and Hypothetico-Inductive Inference* (together with Ilkka Niiniluoto).
- 1973 *Theoretical Concepts.*



Walking and Talking Together – 35 years of Love, Sweat and Tears



Raimo Tuomela


The We-mode Group as Ontologically Irreducible:
ontologically a weakly collectivist view, with individuals as the causal motors

KEYWORDS
ontological reducibility / irreducibility
and ontological individualism / collectivism

KEY FEATURES OF WE-MODE GROUPS

- supervenient emergence: *emergent properties on the group level*
- functional social action systems
- non-intentional system with causal power

groups “act” only in an extrinsic (“as if” or partly fictitious) sense, when the group members act qua members of a social group



Maj Tuomela



ONTOLOGICALLY INDIVIDUALISTIC BUT WEAKLY COLLECTIVISTIC ... AND ONTOLOGICALLY IRREDUCIBLE

On the dispositional account of gender identity

JENKINS (2018) & DEMBROFF (2020) CLAIM THAT MCKITRICK, S (2015) DISPOSITIONAL ACCOUNT OF GENDER IDENTITY IS NOT SENSITIVE TO TRANS AND NONBINARY GENDER IDENTITIES



Matthew Turyn

KEY PROBLEM

McKittrick focuses entirely on behavioral dispositions:

Having a particular gender is nothing more than to be disposed to act in certain ways that are taken by one's society to be gendered.

BUT behaviors people of different genders engage might be similar

* not offering the necessary and sufficient conditions for a persons' being a member of one gender or another, but instead suggest a dispositional view of gender identity that could succeed.

SOLUTION

→ two ways dispositions can manifest:
dispositions associated with gender identity can manifest in both **psychological and behavioral states**

by accounting for psychological states

- such as different individuals' motivating reasons for engaging in certain behaviors

→ acknowledge the fact that certain elements of individuals' gender identities have nothing to do with behaviors

→ someone who is disposed to take the norms relevant to womanhood in their society to be relevant to them can thus properly be acknowledged as a woman, on this view, regardless of how they actually behave.

Implications of Weaponized Dissent in a Post-Truth World

MANY BELIEVE THE WESTERN WORLD IS NOW LIVING IN A 'POST-TRUTH' ERA



Geoffrey D Callaghan

PROBLEMS

control power-holders have increased opportunities to weaponize truth:

- withhold information in order to manipulate people toward a particular course of action
- tear down the entire edifice upon which rational thought is based
- bolster their own agenda by incentivizing people to join popular movements on bases quite distinct from their genuine political will
- weaponized falsehoods stand to undermine claims to truth then
- weaponized dissent stands to undermine the authenticity of popular movements

some have argued for greater restrictions on free speech

- By holding communicative networks to standards of verifiability, we improve our chances that the outcomes of political processes can be said to actually represent the will of the people.

QUESTIONS TO SOLVE

- I. Whether an equivalence can be drawn between (1) rationales for regulating speech on the basis of weaponized truth and (2) rationales for regulating assembly on the basis of weaponized dissent.
- II. If such an equivalence can be drawn, what are some the implications that follow?

*Sunday,
14.8.2021*

Preston J. Werner On the Metaethics and Metasemantics of Conceptual Engineering	Natalia Zakrzewska Struggle and Social Ontology
Torsten Menge Power's Expressive Role and the "Essential Contestedness" of Social Ontology	Eve Kitsik An Ethical Case for Ethics-First Social Metaphysics
Richard Rowland Expressivist and Fitting Treatment Accounts of Gender	Franz Altner A Problem for Proceduralist Accounts of Group Agency
Anna Bloom Christen Ad Tendere: Joint Attention as a Mode of 'Stretching Towards' the World Together	Lukas Fuchs Shaping the Market: Enablement, Responsibility and Climate Change
Valeria Martino I am one of you: Transgenerational Actions and Subjects	Joseph Conrad The Corporation as a Social Fact and as a Social Group
Adam Burgos & Alejandro Arango Neither Race nor Ethnicity: Latinidad as a Social Affordance	Danrlei Lopes Souza Being-with in infancy: the development of social cognition and the pragmatically contextualized activities
Tim Juvshik Artifacts and Social Dependence	Matthew Baddorf Collective Punishment
Beau Branson Social Ontology and Ecclesiology	Ravi Sekhar Chakraborty Social Ontology in the Light of the Primacy of Social Change
Shalom Chalson Do Groups Matter in Algorithmic Discrimination?	Eric Bayruns García Belief Content and Rationality: Why Racist Beliefs Are Not Rational
KEYNOTE Carolina Sartorio - Causal Contributions and Responsibility	

On the Metaethics and Metasemantics of Conceptual Engineering

Preston J. Werner

SUCCESSFUL CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING REQUIRES A COMMITMENT TO SUBSTANTIVE NORMATIVITY WITHIN OUR METASEMANTIC THEORY

CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING: PROCESS OF AIMING TO ADD, IMPROVE, OR REMOVE CONCEPTS OR ENTIRE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS

possibility of conceptual ethics depends on normative truths that are subject-independent
BUT 1st-order CE & reflection on the nature of conceptual change often lack reflections on metanormative commitments

Realism: too conservative
→ cannot accommodate the normative ambitions
Pragmatism: too permissive
→ is incompatible with independently plausible theories of content determination

- **Strawson's Challenge:** CE cannot do interesting philosophical work, since it merely "solves" a philosophical or normative problem by changing the concepts involved, and thus changing the subject
- **Metasemantic Challenge:** CE is impossible, since the content of our concepts is not within our control to change, given any plausible metasemantic framework of how concepts get their referents

TENSION BETWEEN NORMATIVE AMBITIONS & SUBJECT-INDEPENDENT NATURE OF CONTENT DETERMINATION

→ reject the tenability of conceptual engineering

- OR understand metasemantics as incorporating subject-independent normative facts
- help to anchor social concepts to their referents
 - deeply normative social & political considerations help to fix the referents

INCORPORATING NORMATIVITY INTO METASEMANTIC THEORY CAN DO FULL JUSTICE TO THE VARIETY OF CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING PROJECTS

A Problem for Proceduralist Accounts of Group Agency



Franz Altner

STANDARD FUNCTIONALIST THEORIES OF GROUP AGENCY (*PROCEDURALIST ACCOUNTS* (E.G. CHRISTIAN LIST / PHILIP PETTIT))

→ GROUP AGENCY = DECISION MECHANISMS SATISFYING RATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

These accounts fail to distinguish between

- behavior that is attributable to a group agent but amounts only to group activity
- autonomous intentional group actions that we can treat as a group agent's will

problems for theories of collective responsibility focusing on the quality of will for appropriate attributions of blame & praise

example:

managers exploiting powers granted to them within the corporate hierarchy

**resulting group activity meet the conditions for rational agency according to proceduralist
BUT we would intuitively not label them as fully fledged group actions**

Legal scholars

- legal constraints can restrict the space of actions counting as actions of the group agent

→ such activities should be attributed to the individuals

→ distinguish between the corporate will & activities of the managers who, within their role, hijack the corporate mind for their own self-serving ends

The Corporation as a Social Fact and as a Social Group

CORPORATIONS COUNTING AS MORAL AGENTS AND BEARING MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES



Joseph Conrad

ONTOLOGICAL QUESTION OF WHAT CORPORATIONS ARE

Standard Model of Social Ontology (social facts / constructs)

Searle: social world is a product of our collective intentions /
corporations come into being by way of certain status ascriptions

→ independent of collective agency

Consensus View (social groups / group agents)

List / Pettit: ontological individualism as a claim about
supervenience / *corporations as being constituted by group agents*

→ independent of social or legal status

What seems lacking is an ontological conception of corporations that can successfully explain corporations as both social institutions and group agents.

→ RECONCILES COMPETING THEORIZATIONS AS SOCIAL FACTS AND SOCIAL GROUPS.

Epstein's ontological framework of grounding & anchoring social facts

→ overcoming the divide between the social fact & social group view by

- recognizing collective moral agency & going beyond conceptions of individual role obligation
- going beyond conceptions of collective moral responsibility & recognizing that corporations are not just groups but social institutions whose actions are enabled through their institutional status

Collective Punishment

ORGANIZED SOCIAL GROUPS—COLLECTIVES—CAN BE MORALLY AND LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR ACTIONS IN WAYS THAT TRANSCEND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THEIR MEMBERS



Matthew Baddorf

How collectives punishment can be justified?

domain of individual punishment: punishment needs to be justified by some account that explains why inflicting deliberate harm on wrongdoers is permissible.

- collective analogue to this problem is sparse, and particularly urgent given the tendency of collective punishments to harm innocent individuals.

→ evaluate common justifications for individual punishment regarding their usefulness for cases of collective punishment

Deterrence

- does not require collective punishment as such, since it can be achieved by sanctions that do not constitute true punishments
- may not provide enough reason to punish to overcome the harm such punishments cause to innocent individuals

Desert-based justifications

- Guilty should suffer! But even if this works for individual punishment, doesn't provide us with much reason for collective punishment

Expressive Justifications

Punishing expresses our severe disapproval of wrongdoing. Does provide us with justification!

- explains why we feel some need for collective punishment
- provides us with guidance about when collective punishment is worth the risks of harm it poses to innocent individuals

Our expressive reasons for collective punishment turn out to vary depending on how much similarity there is between the collective's action and those of the individuals whose actions partially constitute it, as well as with the efficacy of related individual punishments.

Social Ontology and Ecclesiology

aspects of Social Ontology

- *synchronic questions*: what social entities are, how they are constituted or related to lower-level entities
- *diachronic questions*: particularly concerning the identity conditions of a social entity over time

theological debate (concerning Ecclesiology, raised during the Protestant Reformation)

- concerns the nature of the Church
 - what constitutes the Church
 - conditions of its persistence over time

IF Church is supposed to be some kind of social entity,
THEN current discussions in Social Ontology may shed light on the Ecclesiological debate

What are the most pressing metaphysical difficulties for Ecclesiologies regarding the conditions of persistence of a social entity and continuity?



Beau Branson

Belief Content and Rationality: Why Racist Beliefs Are Not Rational

NOVEL DEFENSE OF THE EVIDENTIALIST THESIS

EVIDENTIALIST

- epistemic justification:= Person S is justified in believing proposition p at time t if and only if S's evidence for p at t supports believing p.

MORAL ENCROACHMENT THESIS

- epistemic status of an opinion can depend on its moral features



Eric Bayruns García

PROBLEM

- both sides seem to suppose that the belief class of seemingly-rational-racist beliefs obtains
- both sides conceive of the content of race terms and beliefs that attribute negative features to Black, Indigenous and Latinx persons without considering how they function in a racially unjust society

DEFENDING EVIDENTIALIST

- an externalist version
- by claiming that this belief class of seemingly-rational-racist beliefs does not obtain because beliefs with this kind of content are false and evidentially unsupported

RACISTS CLAIMS ARE NOT RATIONAL – NOT TRUE

Causal Contributions and Responsibility

HOW CAUSAL CONTRIBUTIONS CAN AFFECT OUR MORAL RESPONSIBILITY



Carolina Sartorio

MAIN CLAIM

moral responsibility for outcomes depends on our causal contribution to the outcome

- Actual causal contributions don't come in degrees, but there are other metaphysical notions that can be brought to bear on this debate, and some of those notions do come in degrees.

SUFFICIENT MEASURES: (objective) probability of a negative outcome due to the agents is larger than the probability due to other factors

NECESSITY MEASURES: difference-making / counterfactual dependence



POISON 1

100 drops are lethal

A contributes 99 / B contributes 1

- appearance: A contributes more than B to victim's death

POISON 2 [joint causation]

100 drops are lethal

A contributes 50 / B contributes 50

- higher on necessity BUT lower on sufficiency

POISON 3 [overdetermination]

50 drops are lethal

A contributes 50 / B contributes 50

- higher on lower sufficiency BUT lower on necessity

POISON 4 [simple causation]

50 drops are lethal

A contributes 50

- appearance A contributes more compared to poison 3

**other things are equal (similar intentions & beliefs)*

strategy 1:

appealing to decomposable outcomes

- avoiding to conflate different outcomes
- A & B caused O1= total number of drops, which caused O2= death | A caused a larger part of O1 than B

strategy 2:

appealing to general powers

- avoiding to conflate actual contributions with general powers
- acts have general causal power → contributing 99 drops is generally more harmful than 1 drop

strategy 3:

appealing to grounds

- avoiding to conflate degrees of causal contributions with the existence of more grounds (reasons)
- counterfactual dependence is typically thought to be sufficient for causation (even if not necessary)

Monday, 16.8.2021

Claudia Tosi	Alexander Franklin
The Authenticity Effect as the Necessary Property of Documentary	Social Construction, Physical Construction, and Emergence
Onni Hirvonen	Chris Genovesi
The “Basic Structure” of a Society: A Recognition-Theoretical Account	World Making Metaphors
Jules Salomone-Sehr	
Complicity: A Minimalist Account	
Ricardo F. Crespo	Matteo Bianchin
The Aristotelian Metaphysics of “Social Collectives”	Agent-Neutral Roles and Agent Neutral Reasons: How Does Social Cognition Shape the Normative Infrastructure of Cooperation?
Eyja M. Brynjarsdottir	Spyridon Orestis Palermos
You Are What You Buy: Self-Making through Consumption and Consumer-Making as Self-Expression	Collaborative Knowledge: Where the distributed and commitment models merge
Aaron Bentley	Henrique Raskin
Rosa Luxemburg and the Transformative Power of Democratic Self Management	A Dialectic Approach to Reconcile Liberalism and Communitarianism
Chaeyoung Paek	Philip Yaure
Making Things Collectively	Seizing Citizenship: Frederick Douglass’s Abolitionist Republicanism
Anna Moltchanova	Mihailis E. Diamantis
Status Function with Attribution Distortion—Reconsidering the Notion of Institutional Status Roles	The Fiction of Corporate Agency
Oscar A. Ralda	
The Significance of Social Ontology in the Critique of Political Economy	
Ken Oshitani	Robert H. Wallace
The Individualist Restriction and Collective Agency	Obstacles and the Social Constitution of Agency

Social Construction, Physical Construction, and Emergence

KIND K'S SALIENCE DUE TO SOCIAL RATHER THAN (E.G.) BIOLOGICAL FACTORS



Alexander Franklin

→ racial kinds' salience primarily due to social factors
BUT conception of race in mainstream discourse isn't socially constructed
e.g. Hardimon (2017), Garcia (2019)

analogy

social construction	physical construction
person with particular ancestry	liquid with particular underlying properties
may be socially constructed as a member of a certain race	is physically constructed as having a certain viscosity

- only in the presence of certain structures (social or physical) that the underlying properties gain salience for explanation

→ socially constructed:=
social structures are responsible for
its underlying properties' salience
for explanation → Ásta's (2018)

DEFENSE OF A GENERAL ACCOUNT OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION

distinction

- kind's having defining properties that are social
- kind's being socially constructed

→ kinds may have non-social defining properties, while still being socially constructed

THERE ARE IMPORTANT DISANALOGIES BETWEEN SOCIAL & PHYSICAL CONSTRUCTION,
BUT BOTH ARE SPECIAL CASES OF (WEAK ONTOLOGICAL) EMERGENCE

→ socially constructed kinds emerge just as all other non-fundamental scientific kinds emerge

1. social construction is less controversial and more generic than is often appreciated
2. debates over the metaphysics of race should be distinguished from discussions of social construction

The “Basic Structure” of a Society: A Recognition-Theoretical Account

SOCIETY CAN BE THOUGHT OF AS BEING CONSTITUTED OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND/OR INSTITUTIONALIZED SOCIAL PRACTICES



Onni Hirvonen

BUT not all of these are equally relevant for the existence of a society
“basic structures” of a society → basic institutions
WHICH & WHY ? | ESSENTIAL OR HISTORICALLY CONTINGENT?



(NEO-)HEGELIAN MODEL

Hegelian recognition theory.

- 1) institutions of care
- 2) institutions that are based on merit achievements, and work
- 3) legal & governmental institutions

institutional differentiation central for modern society Honneth (1995; 2014)

- 1) family
- 2) markets
- 3) civil society

BASIC INSTITUTIONS ARE BASED ON A PARTICULAR FORM OF INTERPERSONAL RECOGNITION

- family: love and care
- markets: esteem for achievements and capabilities
- civil society: equal and mutual respect between citizens

left out outside of its analysis

- broader normative frameworks also called institutions
- cultural frameworks, language, deeply rooted habits of behavior

CHALLENGES:

- include very different entities in the list of basic structures or institutions of a society e.g. cultural structures or sociological fields
- all social entities are in some sense based on interaction but, at the same time, it is clear that institutions and structures direct and structure individuals' actions and understanding.

- not sufficiently manage to differentiate the key institutions
- not clear whether these are really based on different modes of recognition
 - family combines elements from care-relations, rights, and work contributions

TAKE HOME MESSAGE

we can close in on these issues by making distinctions between the coverage, stability and level of structuration of the institutions

Complicity: A Minimalist Account

COMPLICITY:= DERIVATIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR OTHERS' WRONGDOING



Jules Salomone-Sehr

AGENCY-BASED MINIMALIST ACCOUNT

- does justice to the possibility of complicity with structural injustice
- does not depend on the content of one's mental states

DEFINITION OF COMPLICITY IN WRONGDOING ϕ

Accomplices play their part in a plan meant to ϕ , whether or not they intend to participate in that plan or knows that they are participating in that plan.

ADEQUACY CRITERIA

If A is an accomplice of P, it need not be the case that

- ❖ had A not been involved, P would not have acted wrongly, a criterion that argues against causation-based accounts where causation is understood counterfactually
- ❖ P be an accomplice of A, a criterion that Kutz's account arguably violates;
- ❖ A has contributed either intentionally or knowingly to ϕ , as the possibility of complicity with structural injustice suggests
- ❖ A be blameworthy, as civil law, but also social life suggest.

Causation-based accounts Gardner (2007)

- require that the accomplice cause the principal to act wrongly

Agency-based accounts,

- require that there be an agential connection between the accomplice & the wrongdoing.

CHALLENGES

- lowering the bar for what counts as complicit conduct → complicity may be blameless
- minimalist account might distribute complicitous responsibility too widely

Tuesday, 17.8. 2021

Weronika Mincewicz-Podrecka	David Mark Kovacs
Social ontology of sexual consent and its legal implications	What is a People?
Artur Kosecki Social World and Roman Ingarden's Views on Ontology	
SYMPOSIUM: Luka Burazin, Margaret Gilbert, Brian Tamanaha, Michael Schmitz	John Horden
Rights, rules and roles in law and morality	Pseudo-Singularity Defended
	Elvira Basevich
	The Shared Experience of Oppression
	Baris C. Kastas
	Pushing Expressivism Further: A Narrative Paradigm for Collective Responsibility
Damian Fisher	Ricky Mouser
Das Man, Idle , and Collective Deception	How to Read a Riot
Jonathan Schaffer	Yujia Song
Social Construction and Realisms	The Hidden Problem in Moral Imagination
Max F. Kramer Standing as a basic social property	
Stephanie Collins	Alejandro Naranjo Sandoval
How Do Organisations (Metaphysically) Relate to Their Members?	On the Relation between Stereotypes and Racial Reality
Sean Donahue	Noriaki Okamoto
Collective Procedural Memory	A pursuit of the significance of social ontology in social scientific research: An insight from rhetorical institutionalism

A third realm of right



Margaret Gilbert

A THIRD REALM OF RIGHTS NEEDS TO BE ADDED TO THE TWO REALMS GENERALLY ACCEPTED IN RIGHTS THEORY

LEGAL (INSTITUTIONAL) REALMS

institutions:=

- systems of rules (*blueprints for behavior*)
- abstract object with components one can meaningfully refer to
 - neither a part of the physical world nor a feature of consciousness, rather sth. that can be represented in thought
- lack normative implications
 - *persons must stand in a special relationship to the institution to have a reason to follow*

CHALLENGE

- institutional rules may refer to demand-rights which are possessed by some class of persons irrespective of the institution
- may admit such demands to be acceptable from an institutional point of view

BUT NO ONE HAS ANY EXERCISABLE DEMAND-RIGHTS BY VIRTUE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE INSTITUTION QUA ABSTRACT OBJECT.

MORAL REALMS

- system of rules: requirements, duties, permissions, prohibitions
- normative for human beings

CHALLENGE:

HARD TO SEE HOW THE MORAL REALM ACCOMMODATES DEMAND-RIGHTS IN PARTICULAR


REALM OF COMMITMENTS OF THE WILL

THIRD REALM OF RIGHTS = A BASIS FOR DEMAND-RIGHTS

AGREEMENTS GIVE DEMAND-RIGHTS

- joint commitment can constitute agreements
 - by open expressions of readiness to be jointly committed with the relevant others
 - jointly committed people = normatively committed as one
- There is something they, considered together, ought to do
(*not in a moral sense*)

**JOINT COMMITMENT = SOURCE OF DEMAND-RIGHTS
→ THE SOLE REALM OF EXERCISABLE DEMAND-RIGHTS**



READ CHAPTER 13

LEGAL OFFICES AND LEGAL POWER



Luka Burazin

legal offices :=

- social artifacts (created for some purpose) e.g. the office of a president, judges, members of parliament
- ontological: immaterial institutional artifacts
- rule-based + collective recognition:
 - derived legal offices (DLO): brought into existence by an existing legal norm (→ constitution-maker)
 - original legal offices (OLO): brought into existence by social norm of recognition (→ citizen)
- office holder always have authority & power


4 CLAIMS

1) a set of legal positions which constitutes a legal office necessarily includes at least one legal power

2) legal offices are always constituted by power-conferring norms

3) legal offices necessarily include at least a minimum liberty to exercise the powers of the office

4) legal offices can never be dissociated from the powers they consist in (rejection of the dissociation thesis)



Considerations on the relation of philosophy (analytic philosophy of law) and social sciences


ARE THEY INVESTIGATING THE SAME PHENOMENA?



Brian Tamanaha

• INTERSUBJECTIVITY

- social self as a base-line
- analysis how people are constituted as social selves
- focus on intersubjectivity - intersubjective minds



MEAD

A PRAGMATIST GIVING A
NATURALISTIC ACCOUNT

• HOLISM & HISTORICISM

- all social institutions
 - are interconnected
 - evolve over time

How to Read a Riot



Ricky Mouser

Necessity Constraint: a defensive harm is only permissible if it is the least harmful option that would still be efficacious

Success Constraint: a defensive harm must have a reasonable chance of averting (or at least ameliorating) harm

Proportionality Constraint: the defensive harm incurred must be proportionate to the harm it aims to avert

	civilly disobedient means	violently uncivil means
just protesting	protestive civil disobedience → e.g. King • often meet all constraints	protestive physical violence → political rioters • sometimes meet all constraint
aiming for separation	revolutionary civil disobedience → e.g. Gandhi • success is questionable	revolutionary physical violence → e.g. Washington • rarely meet all constraints

1. Political rioting is, roughly, group political action by violently uncivil means for ultimately protestive ends.
2. In assessing or participating in rioting, our focus should be on the Necessity and Proportionality Constraints.

Wednesday, 18.8.2021

Nicolai Knudsen: Shared action: An existential phenomenological approach	David P. Schweikard: Competition as Joint Action
Andreea Popescu: The Easy Approach to Group Agency	David Thunder: The Social Ontology of the Sovereign State: A Critical Assessment
Michaël Bauwens: On the metaphysics of property and exchange: a dispositional account	Francesco Franda: Getting Real About Antirealism
Nicolas Kleinschmidt: Is There Successively Collective Authorship of (Abstract) Artifacts?	John Horden & Dan López de Sa: People and Places
Tom Grimwood: A Social Ontology of Safeguarding Practice Reviews: Reconciling Assemblage with Critique	Marco di Feo: Ontological Foundations of Collective Intentionality
Neil Van Leeuwen: Two Theoretical Roles for “Belief”	John D Greenwood: Durkheim’s Dogma
Éliot Litalien: Epistemic Agency: Individual Failings, Collective Responsibility	
Megan Hyska: Toward a Theory of Social Organizing	
Seumas Miller: Joint Moral Rights and Collective Entities	Jennifer Wang: Social Ontology in Early Confucian Philosophy
KEYNOTE Tamara Metz: From Neoliberalism’s Family Values to a Democratic Politics of Care	

Competition as Joint Action

COOPERATION & COMPETITION ARE ASSUMED TO BE CONTRADICTORY FORMS OF SOCIAL ACTION &
COOPERATION IS TREATED AS THE PARADIGM FOR JOINT ACTIONS



David P. Schweikard

→ conceptual constriction of joint action to unhindered, frictionless, and successful coordinated activities

BUT competing agents are

- **also guided by common beliefs & commitments**
- **somehow engaged in cooperative joint action (not full-blown or pure cooperation)**

e.g. rule-governed context such as sports contests, regulated markets, chess with individual not co-realizable goals

→ OUR UNDERSTANDING OF COOPERATION MUST BE WIDENED TO CAPTURE THE INTENTIONAL STRUCTURE OF RULE-GOVERNED FORMS OF COMPETITION

(1) competition within games entail

- commitment of following the rules
- believe that the other is equally committed

(2) existing accounts can (partly) account for competition

- Bratman's analysis wrt requirement of „meshing subplans“
- Tuomela's understanding of we-mode & I-mode

(3) certain forms of competition are reliant on cooperative attitudes

(4) entails vis-a-vis the competitors' perspectives as well as external observation and evaluation of competitive interactions

The Easy Approach to Group Agency

IS THE ATTRIBUTION OF AGENCY TO GROUPS LEGITIMATE?



Andreea Popescu

STANDARD WAY IN WHICH GROUP AGENCY IS FRAMED

substantive approach

- relies on metaphysical criteria for existence: causal efficacy, mind independence etc.

→ *variety of views concerning group agency*

- attribution of attitudes to groups can be explained away by logical analysis (Ludwig 2016)
- group agency cannot be explained away, but should not be taken literally: a conceptual acceptance without ontological acceptance (Schmitt 2003)
- realism with respect to group agency (List and Pettit 2011)

→ substantive approach unnecessarily complicates the way we discuss the existence of group agency

→ deflationism is simplifying the debates about group agency

deflationary approach

- allows only empirical or conceptual answers to existence questions (Thomasson 2015)

(1) provides a straightforward yes or no answer whether there are group agents, while still keeping the realist commitment if the answer is affirmative.

(2) realist view need not be supplemented with an animist explanation

(3) given a deflationist view, accepting the existence of social groups entails that group agents exist as well

On the metaphysics of property and exchange: a dispositional account

STANDARD THEORY OF EXCHANGE SHOULD BE REPLACED BY ACTION THEORY OF EXCHANGE (MASSIN & TIEFFENBACH 2017)



Michaël Bauwens

goods-centered / fails to adequately capture exchanges of services, which the STE treats as intangible goods

deals with services and treats exchanges of goods as a subspecies of actions

- dichotomy between goods & services can be overcome (Commons 1931, 1936)

→ WHAT IS EXCHANGED ARE NEITHER GOODS NOR SERVICES, BUT OWNERSHIP OF GOODS AND SERVICES

rights = legal control = possible physical control = possible alternative actions

- rights over (im)material goods → possible actions → powers or dispositions whose manifestation is contingent upon the free decision and action of the person, relying on a standard libertarian conception of the alternative possibilities

- agreeing with ATE on the propositional & convergent nature of exchanges relative to a certain state of affairs,
- BUT interpersonal exchanges are grounded by the permanent intra-personal exchange
 - person is exchanging another possible but lesser valued state of affairs for the one that is made manifest because it is valued more

Two Theoretical Roles for “Belief”

TWO THEORETICAL ROLES OF THE TERM “BELIEF” (MUNDANE VERSUS GROUPISH BELIEFS) IN PHILOSOPHY & COGNITIVE SCIENCE



Neil Van Leeuwen

MUNDANE THEORETICAL ROLE FOR “BELIEF.”

- descriptive attitude to both knowledge & error
- explain action in relation to interests

GROUPISH THEORETICAL ROLE FOR “BELIEF.”

- attitude explaining why people stay bonded together in groups

CLAIM

mental states that satisfy the Mundane Role are not the same in nature as those that satisfy the Groupish Role,

- respective mental states—mundane versus groupish beliefs—differ in how they are processed
- Mundane beliefs should respond to evidence and not be voluntary, while groupish beliefs won't respond to evidence and will indeed be voluntary. Empirical evidence supports this distinction.

Epistemic Agency: Individual Failings, Collective Responsibility

WE CAN BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BELIEFS WE HOLD & FOR FAILING TO SATISFY THE EPISTEMIC NORMS



Éliot Litalien

- BUT we often cannot control our beliefs, due to our cognitive and rational limitations
- one should not be held responsible for something that is outside one's control

→ **we should not be subject of (epistemic) blame**

control condition for epistemic responsibility is not invalidated BUT its usefulness is importantly limited

individuals, taken by themselves, might not be in a position to overcome those limitations

BUT groups or institutions in which they exercise their epistemic agency often are in a position to help them do so

MAIN CLAIM

WHEN THE GROUP OR INSTITUTION—THE COLLECTIVE— IS IN A POSITION TO HELP INDIVIDUAL AGENTS SATISFYING CERTAIN EPISTEMIC NORMS
→ RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAILING TO SATISFY THOSE EPISTEMIC NORMS SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO FALL (AT LEAST ALSO) ON THAT COLLECTIVE

Thursday, 19.8.2021

Andreas Antoniou: Is Democracy Existential? The Philosophy of Existence on Modern Challenges	Chi Kwok & Tully Rector: The Ontological Questions of Data Power
Mateusz Tofilski: Ecological and Social Affordances in the Social Cognition	Arto Laitinen / David P. Schweikard / Teemu Toppinen: Collective Expressivism in Social Ontology?
Paolo Di Lucia & Lorenzo Passerini Glazel: Society and Nature Revisited	Frank Hindriks: The Problem of Insignificant Hands: Collective Responsibility Revisited
Michał Dudek: The Immateriality Thesis: A Critical Commentary	Giulia Lasagni: Social groups and the problem of persistence through change
Zoe Pettler: The Injustice of Wrongly Denied Gratitude: Children as Developing Moral Agents	Anna Strasser: Can joint commitments live longer than individual commitments?
James Cobb: Unmitigated Blackness: Race and Grounding in Paul Beatty's The Sellout	
Gloria Sansò: Dispositional properties in the social realm	Gillian Gray: A Pragmatic Pluralist Approach to Social Categories of Identity
Matthew Lampert: Persons, Agents, Machines	Cansu Hepcaglayan: Why the value of citizenship doesn't ground political obligations
Jimmy Lewis-Martin: Groups are Individuals, Too: Individuating Group Agents	Jorge Lucas Seamanduras Ameca: Uncut Coins. Money neutrality and reality surplus
Jasmine Gunkel: What is Intimacy?	

Collective Expressivism in Social Ontology?



Arto Laitinen / David P. Schweikard / Teemu Toppinen

STANDARD EXPRESSIVIST VIEWS

expressivism about thought & talk concerning a subject matter D

- no need to start from what such thought & talk is about
- explain them in terms of what states of mind or attitudes such thought & talk expresses
- thinking that an action is wrong = being opposed to acting in that way
- treat judgments ('S ought to A') like a plan (Gibbard 2003)

COLLECTIVE EXPRESSIVISM

no need to start from what it is to have the relevant social properties

explain the metaphysical unease many have with regard to talk about collective agential & mental properties

provide a way of understanding our thought & talk about such properties in terms of

- functioning as expressions of we-intentions (Sellars)
- collective acceptance (Tuomela)
- conferral (Asta)

➤ treat judgments like we-planning

+ expressivism about the talk & thought about institutions, roles & positions → normative reasons, duties, rights, & responsibilities

CIRCULARITY WORRY

Suppose that what is expressed is something like collective acceptance or "we-intention"

→ Does collective intentionality end up being both the analysandum and the analysans?

Can joint commitments live longer than individual commitments?



Anna Strasser

varieties of commitments



potential answers

NON-NORMATIVIST
there are joint actions
without a joint
commitment



IN-BETWEEN
at least a minimal sense of
commitment is to be found

NORMATIVIST
all joint actions have
necessarily a joint
commitment



experimental approaches


FORMAL APPROACHES TESTING INTUITIONS BY SYSTEMATICALLY SAMPLING NAIVE PARTICIPANTS' INTUITIONS ABOUT EXPERIMENTALLY CONTROLLED SCENARIOS



A MINIMAL SENSE OF JOINT COMMITMENT CAN LIVE LONGER THAN INVOLVED INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENTS

Unmitigated Blackness: Race and Grounding in Paul Beatty's *The Sellout*

AFRO PESSIMISM VERSUS AFRO OPTIMISM



Paul Beatty (2015)

- manipulates stereotypical figurations of race
- takes existing, negative stereotypes about black people and ramps them up
- modifying the existing social hierarchies while providing the metaphysical framework for race
- preventing ontological considerations of race in fiction as outside of oppression



James Cobb

CONTEMPORARY DEFINITIONS OF GENDER (SALLY HASLANGER, MARI MIKKOLA, ELIZABETH BARNES)

- force us into singular readings of the black subject in 21st Century African American fiction
 - *Haslanger*: “tracking” of racial talk, which stipulates our ontological analysis of race we should have as a goal tracking what language about race does, rather than simply what it references → understand oppression’s relation to race
 - *Barnes*: “a complex network of interpersonal social hierarchies” we cannot speak about the racial properties of a black character, qua black, without commenting on their position in that hierarchy

BUT we might understand black fiction differently
if we understand race as less fundamental when figured oppressively

- Johnathon Schaffer’s grounding can be a good place to start to question the relationship between the property of oppression and race
 - rethink the fundamentality of any particular definition in relation to a subject

A Pragmatic Pluralist Approach to Social Categories of Identity

SOCIAL CATEGORIES (RACE, GENDER, SEXUALITY)

DIFFERENT WAYS OF ANSWERING THE QUESTION, "WHO AM I?" + MANY FURTHER QUESTIONS



Gillian Gray

PRAGMATIC PLURALIST APPROACH TO SOCIAL CATEGORIES

addresses multiple explanatorily important questions – none of these questions take priority

- “What relatively stable and/or given features do I have?”
- “Who do I take myself to be?”
- “How do I present myself to others?”
- “How do others perceive me?”

example: sexual orientation

THEORETICAL BENEFITS:

- capture an individual’s experience of identity with more explanatory adequacy than approaches which take one of the four questions listed above to have metaphysical priority
- capture a wider range of more nuanced forms of oppression, which can help in identifying and addressing identity-based injustice

Friday, 20.8.2021

<p>SYMPOSIUM: Jonathan Havercroft, Shuk Ying Chan and Avia Pasternak: Ethics of Protest</p>	<p>Andreas Antoniou: Is Democracy Existential? The Philosophy of Existence on Modern Challenges</p>
	<p>Säde Hormio: Group beliefs and lies</p>
	<p>Tivadar Vervoort: Reification and the Social Ontology of Forms of Life</p>
<p>Corrado Roversi: Three Layers of Institutional Power</p>	<p>Niko Popow: Counter-Norms</p>
<p>Yujia Song: The Hidden Problem in Moral Imagination</p>	<p>Catherine Greene: What can finance teach us about social ontology?</p>
<p>Raphaël Künstler: Social Psychology based Social Ontology</p>	<p>Ryan Doody: Compromise and Consensus in Collective Choice</p>
<p>Brian Epstein and Michael D. Ryall: Broadening Formal Models of Individual and Collective Intentionality</p>	<p>Kevin Richardson: Metaphysical Subtraction</p>
<p>Emerson R Bodde: A Social Reproductive Ontology of Class</p>	<p>Jon K. Burmeister: New Agents in the World of Work: Artificial Intelligence and Human Autonomy</p>
<p>Todd Edwin Jones: What is folk sociology? (And how good is it at enabling us to understand behavior?)</p>	<p>Francesca Felder: Transmisogyny in Down Girl</p>
<p>Glenda Satne: Resisting the crowd: a collectivist approach to social bias</p>	<p>Taylor Madigan: Shared Agency, Norms, and Reduction</p>

Responding to riots: A grounded normativity analysis of recent UK riot discourses



Jonathan Havercroft

How does the constitution of political protests by authorities as riots shape the public' perceptions of the legitimacy of grievance underlying the protest? / How did protestors resist moral condemnation of their action by public authorities?

KEY FEATURE OF COMMON LAW ON RIOTS

- senior officer:
 - sole authority to deem a gathering a riot
- discretionary judgment:
 - turns protest into a riot
 - guilty by mere presence
 - often overcharging protestors / delegitimize protests

HISTORY

62 riots in UK in last 25 years

- causes
 - Northern Ireland
 - response to police brutality
 - anti-capitalist riots (London G20 Protests 2009)
 - inter-ethnic violence (Oldham 2001)
 - sporting events

GROUNDING NORMATIVITY

- Tully (2008, 2014), Coulthard & Simpson (2016), Ackerly et al. (2021)
- Turning to empirical analysis of problems to develop engaged normative accounts of justice
- Four main commitments of GNT (Ackerly et al. 2021):
 1. Expanding comprehensiveness of input
 2. Attentiveness to systemic inclusion of range of voices
 3. Recursivity in development of normative claims
 4. Accountability to those affected by normative claims

FUTURE WORK:
stakeholder discussion
with

- politicians & government officials
- police & lawyers
- activist & NGO groups

In Defence of Violent Protests

➤ BOOK MANUSCRIPT '**NO JUSTICE NO PEACE: IN DEFENCE OF VIOLENT PROTESTS**'



Avia Pasternak

COLLECTIVE NATURE OF THE PROTESTS

- share goals & know that they share goals

DEFENSIVE HARM

→ duty to collectivize

e.g., if individual agents cannot rescue so. at their own there is a duty to collectivize

acting alone would imply more violence than acting collectively

BUT spontaneity may lead to the impossibility to coordinate on a higher level

Compromise and Consensus in Collective Choice

ARE THERE OTHER REASONS FOR GROUPS BESIDES FOR ITS OWN SAKE / STRATEGIC / INSTRUMENTAL TO COMPROMISE?



Ryan Doody

CLAIMS

1. IF the compromise option, C, is everyone's "second favorite", then the group ought to choose it.
2. IF the compromise option is everyone's "second least favorite" choice, then the group ought not to choose it.
3. IF there's no consensus about C, then it's permissible but not required for the group to choose it.

Instrumental Rationality (Expected Value). Let $VALUE_i$ be individual i 's value-function. If individual i is *instrumentally rational*, then

$$V_i(X \oplus_p Y) = p \cdot V_i(X) + (1 - p) \cdot V_i(Y)$$

Epistemic Rationality. Let Cr_i be individual i 's credence-function. If an individual i is *epistemically rational*, then:

1. Cr_i is a probability function.
2. If $X \notin M$, then

$$Cr_i(\text{DEC}(M) \square \rightarrow X) = 0.$$

ARGUMENT * appeals to a formal result following from 3 constraints

1. members of the group are instrumentally rational (*utility theory*)
2. group members ought to be uncertain about what the group would ultimately decide to do were it faced with a pairwise choice between options about which they are deeply divided (*Decision-Value Principles*)
3. legitimacy: a group decision is legitimate only if it's made using a procedure that all of its members could agree to.

→ This argument establishes a new decision-rule for rational group agency: Republics of Indeterminacy & Two Decision Rules

Broadening Formal Models of Individual & Collective Intentionality

MODEL EPISTEMIC LIMITATIONS OF REAL-WORLD DECISION MAKERS (BIASES) & MESO-SCALE SOCIAL PHENOMENA

game theory + ontology of
mental states + action theory +
social ontology

GAME THEORY:

- broad range of phenomena with elegant mathematical structures
 - interactive decisions of forward-looking agents
- building blocks are general & parsimonious



Brian Epstein & Michael D. Ryall

CHALLENGES:

- avoiding to reduce multi-scale social phenomena to coordinating agents
- representing epistemic limitations not just as ad-hoc modifications to a belief-desire model

GOALS:

- richer set of building blocks at the outset
 - treat cognitive lives of limited individuals & groups in greater detail
 - role of commitment
- clarify & correct claims in action theory about relations among cognitive states of individuals & between individuals / social groups

FOUNDATIONS OF A MATHEMATICAL FRAMEWORK

functions of intentions:

1. improve the efficiency of agents with epistemic limitations
2. perform a social function

→ formal theory of groups

- including group formation / persistence, aspects of group cognition

→ addressing issues that the formal literature on agency has not been able to treat

- e.g. plan revision in a social context and in response to the plans of others

Saturday, 21.8.2021

KEYNOTE: John Broome:
Self-Interest Against Climate Change

Ludger Jansen:
Khalidi's Trio and the Fourth Kind of Social Kind

David Eduardo Torres Álvarez:
Fictional Characters as Public Institutions

Leonie Smith:
A conceptual analysis of impostor syndrome: what is it, and what do, and should, we want it to be?

Nathaniel Barron:
Ontological Aspects of Critical Theory: Utopia & Critique in Ernst Bloch's Social Ontology

Bernhard Nickel:
Explanatory Unification and the Nature of Social Kinds

Matthew Rachar & Javier Gomez-Lavin:
Why We Need a New Normativism about Collective Action

Kathleen Wallace:
Intersectionality and Social Groups

Randall Harp & Juniper Lovato:
Collective consent in networks

Joy Shim:
The Perspectives of Groups

Seth Goldwasser:
Fake News and Function in Model Pathologies

Sarah Braasch:
Hart's Fatal Mistake in the Concept of Law and How to Fix It

Nicholas Preuth:
Parsing Ontology: Distinguishing Meta-Social Ontology from First-Order Social Ontology

Self-Interest Against Climate Change

AFTER 30 YEARS OF ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE BASIS OF APPEALS TO MORALITY, THE WORLD'S EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GAS CONTINUE TO INCREASE.



John Broome


Paris Agreement, 2015

This Agreement . . . aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change. . . by holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.



BUT the countries didn't intend to take actions regarding this agreement!

(if all pledges to the UN were fulfilled there would still be a median increase of 2.8 degrees by 2100)



You are failing us, but the young people are starting to understand your betrayal. The eyes of all future generations are upon you and if you choose to fail us, I say: We will never forgive you.



MORAL APPEAL HAS FAILED → NO-SACRIFICE APPROACH

- external costs of emission of greenhouse gas have to be 'internalized'
→ price on all greenhouse gas emissions
- new international financial institution
→ World Climate Bank
→ new era of increasing public debt

unavoidable negative consequence:

- owners of giant fossil fuel companies will be rewarded
→ worst feature of a no-sacrifice policy
"I am not happy with it. It sticks in the gullet, but we have to swallow it."
- If the no-sacrifice policy is to be successful, it needs defences against free riding.



Ludger Jansen

Khalidi's Trio and the Fourth Kind of Social Kind

Khalidi's classification of social kinds (2015)	Existence of kind depends on our having propositional attitudes to it	Existence of kind does NOT depend on our having propositional attitudes to it
Existence of instances depends on our having propositional attitudes to them	Permanent resident, prime minister	LEADERSHIPS, PLURAL SUBJECTS
Existence of instances does NOT depend on our having propositional attitudes to them	War, money	Racism, recession

Ludger: add a fourth kind

- possible
- because kinds come in hierarchies
 - reference to instances is possible via higher or lower social kind terms
- ADVANTAGES
- mirror transcultural or epoch-spanning phenomena
 - central terms of social research & social ontology could be captured
 - may feature in scientific explanations

LEADERSHIP:

- in prehistoric times human groups had leaders = attitudes to instances BUT propositional attitudes towards the kind Leader probably arise only later – maybe as late as the twentieth century that saw the rise of leadership research

PLURAL SUBJECTS:

- every instance is established by intentional signalling of one's readiness to form a joint commitment for some collective act BUT before Gilbert's formation of the theoretical concept of a plural subject, it was impossible for anyone to have an attitude towards this term when establishing a token plural subject

A conceptual analysis of impostor syndrome: what is it, and what do, and should, we want it to be?



Leonie Smith

KATHERINE HAWLEY'S ACCOUNT:

- persons suffer because they hold negative mistaken beliefs relating to her own competence in an area in which they are actually successful

IMPOSTOR SYNDROME

SARAH PAUL

- focus on “the debilitating emotional & behavioural consequences of such beliefs” than on the doxastic attitudes themselves

ALTERNATIVE CASES ARE CONCEPTUALLY POSSIBLE

- non-competence impostor beliefs & ‘emotional and behavioural’ reactions can come apart
 - a) → suffer from impostor syndrome while believing to be skilful & successful, yet still having high levels of anxiety
 - b) beliefs are present without related feelings and behaviours

CLAIMS

1. It is possible for significant numbers of people to experience the emotional & behavioural reactions commonly associated with impostor syndrome without experiencing non-competence-based impostor beliefs.
2. Failing to recognise them as conceptually distinct is an issue of social justice.

Collective consent in networks

GROUP CONSENT APPLIED TO ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS



Randall Harp & Juniper Lovato

SOCIAL NETWORKS = ORGANIZED AROUND AN INDIVIDUAL CONSENT PRINCIPLE:

- individual end-users are taken as legitimate owners of the data that they share with the platforms

STRENGTHEN THE RIGHTS SURROUNDING INDIVIDUAL CONSENT IS IMPORTANT

- tighten knowledge condition (properly informed consent of the end-users)
- strengthen individual rights with respect to consent

BUT individual consent to data transactions are ultimately flawed because data transactions do not merely implicate the platform and the end-user

- data transactions can expose personal information of every person who is networked with the end-user
→ **Individual consent to data transactions fails, because data are not merely about the end-user.**

CHALLENGE: CONSENT = IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF DATA TRANSACTIONS → FIND SOMETHING ANALOGOUS TO INDIVIDUAL CONSENT

DISTRIBUTED CONSENT

- grounded in structured & interrelated individual consent transactions
- allow individuals to constitute a group through their (individual) consent-related choices

GROUP CONSENT*

- determine consent of the group as a group agent
- presuppose unified & robust agent with the power to consent

* BUT unsuitable for governing data transactions on social network platforms

- data are too leaky & knowledge condition too demanding
- only suitable group = (democratic) society as a whole



MOST PROMISING SOLUTION:
distributed consent on platforms,
along with governing legislation
aimed at protecting a broad level
of group consent